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NOTES 
THE MORE YOU GAIN, THE MORE YOU LOSE:  
SENTENCING INSIDER TRADING UNDER THE 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Danielle DeMasi Chattin* 
 
Insider trading defendants are sentenced under the general economic 
crime provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  These provisions 
provide a chart, which prescribes a gradually increasing offense level 
based on “the gain resulting from the offense.”  Only two circuit courts 
have yet to define “gain” for sentencing purposes, resulting in a split in 
methodology.  Due to the tremendous weight the Guidelines place on the 
amount of “gain” when calculating a sentence, the potential result of using 
different methodologies to calculate “gain” is the difference between 
freedom and years of incarceration. 
This Note examines the problems involved with both of the methods of 
calculating “gain” for sentencing purposes applied by the circuits.  This 
Note proposes a reexamination and restructuring of the Guidelines’ 
economic crime provisions in order to focus the determination of a 
defendant’s sentence away from an unstable monetary figure and toward 
other factors that truly reflect the culpability of the defendant.  This Note 
argues that a complete restructuring of the economic crime provisions is 
required to fulfill the original objectives upon which the Guidelines were 
created. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine three corporate executives who share the same positive, 
material, nonpublic information about the future of their corporation.  
Based on this information, all three buy 1000 shares of stock at five dollars 
per share, costing them $5000 each.  The positive information is publicized 
four weeks later.  After the fifth week, the market has absorbed the 
information and it is reflected in the stock price, which is now fifteen 
dollars per share.  On this day, Officer A sells his 1000 shares, making 
$10,000.  Officer B retains his shares until three months later, when the 
stock price has risen to fifty dollars per share.  Officer B pockets $45,000.  
Officer C was not so lucky; the market crashes six months later, the stock 
price drops to two dollars per share, and Officer C sustains a loss.1 
All three executives have committed the same crime:  they each 
purchased “a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic 
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or 
confidence,”2 in violation of federal law.3  However, based on one 
interpretation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), all three 
executives would be recommended for a different prison sentence.  This is 
due to the operation of section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines, which prescribes 
increasing the total offense level based on “the gain resulting from the 
offense.”4  If one were to consider “gain” for this purpose as the pocketed 
gains that each executive made on his purchase and subsequent sale of 
stock, Officer A would be sentenced based on a $10,000 gain (resulting in a 
Guideline sentence of six to twelve months);5 Officer B would be sentenced 
based on a $45,000 gain (Guideline sentence of fifteen to twenty-one 
months);6 Officer C would be sentenced at the base level (Guideline 
sentence of no imprisonment to six months).7 
 
 1. Hypothetical situation adapted from United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1107 
(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bright, J., dissenting). 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2010). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, 2B1.4 (2009). 
 5. Id. §§ 2B1.1, 2B1.4, 5A (assuming these defendants are in Criminal History 
Category I). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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However, the intuition of most people would be that this result is unjust.  
As all three executives committed the same offense, their respective 
sentences should reflect their individual culpability, not their luck.8  
Alternatively, a different approach calculates the “gain resulting from the 
offense” by using the stock price at the time the market absorbed the effects 
of the positive, now public information, which was fifteen dollars per 
share.9  Since all three executives purchased stock at the same price, their 
Guideline sentences would be equal.10  This method has been termed the 
“market absorption” method and has only recently been adopted by a circuit 
court as a viable method to calculate insider trading gain.11 
Although the above, over-simplified hypothetical appears to have an easy 
solution, in reality, reaching a precise date of market absorption can be both 
complicated and unreliable.  Therefore, both methods described have flaws 
that could result in sentences that do not fully reflect the defendant’s 
culpability.  Since, in the current Guidelines, the “gain” amount carries the 
greatest weight, relative to other factors, in determining a sentence,12 the 
resulting sentences are based frequently on a flawed figure.  Thus, the 
method for deriving “gain”, as well as the weight “gain” has in determining 
the sentence, are both issues of import.  The two calculation methods that 
have emerged out of the circuits have created a conflict, further 
exacerbating the unpredictability of insider trading sentencing.13 
This Note examines the methods of interpreting the insider trading 
provision of the Guidelines and the motives behind the creation of these 
provisions.  Part I of this Note outlines the historical background of insider 
trading and sentencing law.  Part II describes the current circuit split 
concerning the issue of interpreting “gain” under the applicable Guidelines 
provisions.  Part III of this Note summarizes the problems involved with 
each of the methods applied by the circuits and proposes a reexamination of 
the Guidelines’ economic crime provisions in order to focus the 
determination of a defendant’s sentence away from a monetary figure—
“gain”—and towards a reflection of the true culpability of the defendant.  
Part III argues that a complete restructuring of the economic crime 
provisions is required to fulfill the original objectives upon which the 
Guidelines were created. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING AND SENTENCING LAW 
Part I of this Note highlights the important developments in both 
securities fraud jurisprudence and white collar sentencing law.  Because 
 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (mandating that “[t]he court shall impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary”); id. § 3553(a)(6) (mandating that the sentencing 
court shall consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). 
 9. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.A.4, II.B.2.  
 10. See USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2B1.4, 5A. 
 11. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1085–87 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 12. See USSG § 2B1.4. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
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understanding the nature of the offense and its consequences to the public is 
crucial to shaping an appropriate sentencing policy, Part I.A discusses the 
development of the criminalization of securities fraud and insider trading as 
well as briefly summarizes the effects such offenses have on the public.  
Part I.B outlines the development and philosophy behind federal sentencing 
law.  Finally, Part I.C investigates the legislative history behind the current 
statutory prohibitions penalizing securities fraud in order to highlight that 
political, as opposed to philosophical, reasons underlie the current state of 
white collar sentencing. 
A.  Securities Fraud & Insider Trading Jurisprudence 
1.  The Origins of Securities Law:  Common Law Fraud 
The common law doctrine of fraud, on which all further statutory law is 
based, required proof of five elements:  1) a false statement of 2) material 
fact 3) made with the intention to deceive 4) upon which one reasonably 
relied and 5) which caused injury.14 
Under common law, the elements of fraud are easily met when a 
defendant makes a false statement.  However, the application is less clear in 
a case of omission—nondisclosure of a material fact.  The unlawful conduct 
in question in any insider trading case is the nondisclosure of inside 
information about the future value of the stock in question.15  However, at 
common law, people were expected to bargain for information.16  
Therefore, sellers or buyers of stock were not required to divulge any 
positive or negative information they possessed that might change what the 
other party considered to be a fair price for the stock.  The only instance 
where a seller was required to deal with full and fair disclosure was in 
contracts between trustees and beneficiaries.17 
State courts attempted to apply the trustee-beneficiary duty to directors 
and officers of corporations in several ways.  Initially, a director’s only duty 
was to his corporation and, therefore, he did not owe a duty of disclosure to 
those with whom he traded in the market.18  A minority of courts found that 
a director had a duty to disclose all material information when he traded 
with shareholders in his company’s stock.19  Finally, an intermediate rule 
articulated in Strong v. Repide20 was adopted.  The Strong Court found that 
a director must either disclose material information or refrain from trading 
in face-to-face transactions only where “special facts” exist.21 
 
 14. WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 615 (3d ed., 2009). 
 15. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 16. See id. at 616. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. 213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
 21. Id. at 431.  In Strong, the defendant who purchased stock from a shareholder of the 
company was not only a director, but he was also engaged in negotiations leading to the sale 
of the company’s lands to the government at a price which he knew would greatly enhance 
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Today, common law fraud actions are rare.22  In an open market where 
traders are rarely involved in direct face-to-face transactions, insider trading 
is practically never penalized under common law.23  Insider trading is now 
almost exclusively litigated under the federal securities laws that developed 
out of the common law doctrines.24 
2.  Federal Statutory Authority:  The Securities Act of 1933 & the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)25 was enacted after the Great 
Depression and subsequent market collapse.26  The main remedy of the 
1933 Act was disclosure.27  The 1933 Act forced the “registering” of public 
offerings and securities with a governing body, later commissioned as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).28  The 1933 Act required that 
any material information concerning securities offered on a public market 
must be ascertainable by investors, and prohibited deceit, 
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities to the public.29 
In 1934, Congress held hearings to address the concerns about trading 
practices of “unscrupulous market manipulators”30 after noticing the 
adverse effects false and misleading information had on markets.31  
 
the value of the stock. Id. at 431–32.  The Court found that the director was acting as an 
agent of the shareholders to receive the best available price for their benefit and that he was 
in the unique position to know the true value of the company. Id. at 432.  The Court stressed 
that it was due to these “special facts,” not solely to the fact that the defendant was a director 
of the company, that a duty to disclose the information he held about the value of the stock 
existed. Id. at 431–32; see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 616. 
 22. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 620 (“[A]lmost all litigation of officer and 
director liability for trading in a company’s securities—from the late 1940s to today—has 
been in the federal courts.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (finding 
that Indiana law does not allow a derivative suit against corporate officers and directors for 
trading corporate stock on the basis of material inside information). But see Diamond v. 
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912–13 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that under New York law, officers 
will be liable to the corporation if they trade based on information gleaned solely by virtue of 
their position as officers before disclosing information to the shareholders). See also HENRY 
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 17–26 (1966) (discussing the evolution 
of common law rules).  State fiduciary duty law is still applied in two situations:  when a 
corporation brings a claim against an officer, director, or employee for the profits made by 
trading on information gleaned through his corporate duties; and when shareholders 
challenges the quality of the disclosures that the corporation makes to them. See ALLEN ET 
AL., supra note 14, at 620. 
 24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 25. 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)). 
 26. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (5th 
ed. 2006). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 3–5. 
 30. Id. at 5–6 (describing, as one example of corruption, the practice of “stock pools,” 
that is devices used by brokers and dealers to create a false appearance of trading activity 
intended to induce innocent investors to enter into the market based on these manipulated 
price and volume changes). 
 31. See id. at 6. 
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Furthermore, Congress found it inherently unfair that corporate insiders 
took advantage of the access they had to confidential information to make a 
personal profit.32  These hearings resulted in the enactment of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).33  The 1934 Act created the SEC34 and 
delegated broad authority to the SEC to regulate all matters of trading in 
securities.35  It is under the 1934 Act that SEC Rules are promulgated.36 
The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act clearly attempt to prohibit fraud and 
encourage dissemination of information related to the trading of 
securities.37  However, neither in these acts nor in other legislation has 
Congress ever defined the offense of “insider trading.”38  In fact, there is 
debate regarding whether insider trading should be regulated at all.39  Over 
time courts have applied several statutes to the regulation of insider trading.  
Initially, the 1934 Act sought to regulate the trading of insiders by forcing 
full disclosure by issuers through reporting obligations.40  Additionally, 
Section 16 of the 1934 Act contains a requirement for specific insiders to 
report certain types of transactions.41  When these reporting requirements 
proved inadequate to prevent insiders from abusing confidential 
information for personal benefit,42 the general antifraud section of the 1934 
Act, Section 10,43 and corresponding SEC Rule 10b-544 were targeted for 
proscribing insider trading.45  This rule, derived from Section 10(b) of the 
 
 32. See id.  It is interesting to note that the motivations behind the statutory development 
of securities fraud were to protect ignorant stockholders from manipulation, while today our 
laws work under the assumption that markets are dominated by sophisticated and resourceful 
investors. See id.; infra Part I.A.5.i. 
 33. 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006)). 
 34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006); see 
COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 6. 
 35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006); see COX ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 6. 
 36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-1 (2010) (“[T]he rules and regulations in this part [are] 
prescribed by the Commission pursuant to Title I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”). 
 37. See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text. 
 38. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 879; William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material 
Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets:  Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue 
Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1224 (1981) (“No federal provision 
expressly prohibits the general practice of trading on nonpublic information . . . .”). 
 39. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 690 (“[T]he academic debate has ventured 
even farther afield from popular sentiment by focusing on whether insider trading ought to 
be regulated at all.”); COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 880 (“Some economics-oriented legal 
scholars remain convinced that insider trading regulation is both unnecessary and 
counterproductive . . . .”); see also MANNE, supra note 23, at 138–41 (1966) (arguing that 
insider trading is a key tool of compensation for entrepreneurs and corporate insiders). But 
cf. id. at 147–58 (summarizing the arguments against using insider trading as compensation); 
Wang, supra note 38, at 1225 (“It is unlikely that inside trading is an incentive, much less an 
essential one, for top corporate executives.”).  The debate concerning whether insider trading 
should not be regulated is outside the scope of this Note. 
 40. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 879. 
 41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006). 
 42. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 879. 
 43. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 45. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 879. 
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1934 Act, is the government’s most frequently used tool to regulate insider 
trading.46  
3.  The Elements of Rule 10b-5 
Rule 10b-5 is promulgated under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,47 which 
is the general antifraud section of the 1934 Act.48  Rule 10b-5 is based on 
the common law fraud doctrine.49  Rule 10b-5 expanded the common law 
doctrine into the open market in two landmark cases:  In re Cady, Roberts 
& Co.50 and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.51  Both cases articulated that 
insider trading is an actionable offense because the assumed unequal access 
to information is inherently unfair.52 
 
 46. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“Thus, administrative 
and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of 
statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of 
nondisclosure.”); see also Matthew R. King, Securities Fraud, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1027, 
1057 n.174 (2009) (“Currently, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are the Government’s primary means 
of regulating insider trading.”).  Other statutes and rules that are applicable to insider trading 
under certain circumstances include Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14(e)-
3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, which prohibits trading during tender offers; the federal mail fraud 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); and § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006), 
which requires certain insiders to disgorge any short-swing profits. See William K. S. Wang, 
Recent Developments in the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market Inside Trading, 6 CORP. 
L. REV. 291 (1983), as reprinted in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN SECURITIES REGULATION 59, 
59 (Mark I. Steinberg ed., 1988).  The statutory authority outside of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 47. Section 10 states in part: 
  It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of . . . any 
facility of any national securities exchange . . . 
  (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.  
15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 48. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35 (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a 
catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”); see also COX ET AL., supra note 26, 
at 879. 
 49. Rule 10b-5 states in part: 
  It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of . . . any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
  (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
  (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
  (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 50. Exchange Act Release No. 6,668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 51. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
 52. Id. at 848 (describing that this unfairness frustrates “the justifiable expectation of the 
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively 
equal access to material information”); Cady, Roberts, 40 SEC Docket at 912 (describing the 
obligation to disclose material facts as resting “on two principal elements; first, the existence 
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Since Rule 10b-5 prohibits “deceit” in the trading of securities, the 
elements of Rule 10b-5 are in line with those of common law fraud.53  Rule 
10b-5 requires: (1) a misstatement or omission (2) of material fact (3) with 
scienter54 (4) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security (5) upon 
which the plaintiff reasonably relied and (6) that the plaintiff’s reliance 
proximately caused his or her injury.55  Over time, courts have found 
liability under the Rule to be consistent with the common law fraud 
requirements. 
a.  When Is Omission Unlawful?  Finding a Duty to Disclose 
Rule 10b-5 differed from the common law by including “omission” as an 
actionable offense under federal law.56  A duty to disclose (or abstain from 
trading with) material information was difficult to establish at common law 
in the absence of either a trustee-beneficiary relationship or the existence of 
“special facts.”57  With 10b-5 liability now extended to cover an omission 
of material facts, federal courts grappled with developing a theory under 
which to find a duty to disclose.58 
 i.  The Equal Access Theory 
Initially, the SEC and the courts both adopted the aggressive position that 
mere possession of relevant, material, nonpublic information gave rise to a 
duty to disclose or abstain from trading.59  This theory was called the 
“equal access theory” and operated under the assumption that “all traders 
owe a duty to the market to disclose or refrain from trading on nonpublic 
corporate information.”60  However, the equal access theory was too far 
removed from the strict common law requirement of an affirmative duty to 
disclose and was subsequently rejected by courts.61 
 
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available 
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the 
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is 
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing”) (footnotes omitted); see also COX ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 880. 
 53. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 54. “Scienter” is “an ‘intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud’ by the defendant.” King, 
supra note 46, at 1036 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 
(1976)).  After several cases grappled with the definition of what mental state was required 
to be liable under Rule 10b-5, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 and defined trading “on the 
basis of” inside information as whether or not the trader was “aware” of the information. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b). 
 55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 58. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 632. 
 59. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc); In re 
Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6,668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 911, 913 (Nov. 
8, 1961). 
 60. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 646; see supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980) (rejecting the 
equal access theory). 
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 ii.  The Fiduciary Duty Theory 
The courts next attempted to isolate a preexisting relationship between 
insiders and other traders to support the analogy to the common law 
recognition of the trustee-beneficiary relationship.62  The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Chiarella v. United States,63 rejected the equal access theory and 
found it necessary that the insider breach a fiduciary duty in trading on the 
inside information in order to find Rule 10b-5 liability.64  In so holding, the 
Court established the “fiduciary duty theory” (or the “classical theory”).65  
In Chiarella, the Court overturned the criminal conviction of a financial 
printer who had traded on confidential knowledge of pending takeover bids 
that he had gained via his employment.66  The Court ruled that the printer 
did not breach a disclosure duty by trading on the nonpublic information.67  
Since the printer had learned information from the documents of the 
takeover bidders—and not the target company—he lacked a relationship 
with, and therefore a fiduciary duty to, the shareholders of the target 
companies.68  If instead Chiarella had used the knowledge to trade on the 
shares of the company by which he was employed, the fiduciary duty 
requirement would have been fulfilled.69 
The Court extended the fiduciary duty theory to “tippees” and “tippers” 
in Dirks v. SEC.70  In Dirks, a former employee exposed a company’s 
ongoing fraud to a securities analyst, Dirks, who then informed his own 
clients of the fraud without successfully alerting the public.71  The Court 
found that although Dirks himself did not have a fiduciary relationship with 
the shareholders of the company with whom he traded, the fiduciary duty of 
the employee who “tipped” him could be applied to Dirks in certain 
circumstances.72  In Dirks, the Court reasoned that since the employee, the 
 
 62. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 63. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 64. Id. at 233 (“We cannot affirm petitioner’s conviction without recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, 
nonpublic information.  Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from the 
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties, should 
not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.”); see ALLEN ET 
AL., supra note 14, at 632–33. 
 65. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to 
the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.  
And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information ‘that the other [party] is 
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)); see 
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 632–33. 
 66. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 67. Id. at 233. 
 68. See id. at 232–33; ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 647–48. 
 69. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 647–48. 
 70. 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
 71. Id. at 648–50. 
 72. Id. at 660 (“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation 
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee 
knows or should know that there has been a breach.”). 
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“tipper”, had not personally benefited from the “tippee’s” trading, there was 
no tipper violation of Rule 10b-5 and thus no violation to pass on to the 
tippee.73 
 iii.  The Misappropriation Theory 
The courts eventually found that the fiduciary duty theory alone did not 
enable them to find liability in all appropriate situations.74  Chiarella, for 
example, appeared to be a clear case where liability could have been found 
under a slightly modified duty to disclose.75  The lower courts responded to 
Chiarella by proposing the “misappropriation theory” to reach company 
outsiders who trade illicitly on confidential information.76  The theory holds 
that the deceitful misappropriation of market-sensitive information is itself 
a fraud on the source of the information and is therefore a violation of Rule 
10b-5.77 
In United States v. O’Hagan,78 the Supreme Court also adopted the more 
far-reaching theory.  O’Hagan was a partner at a law firm involved in a 
possible tender offer79 by Grand Metropolitan for the stock of Pillsbury 
Company.80  Although O’Hagan did not work on the account himself, he 
began to purchase call options for Pillsbury stock after his firm began 
representing Grand Metropolitan.81  Once the tender offer was made public, 
O’Hagan exercised his options and was rewarded with a $4.3 million 
profit.82 
The Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory and held that a 
defendant is liable under Rule 10b-5 “when he misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the 
source of the information.”83  The Court felt that this theory built on, and 
did not replace, the fiduciary duty theory outlined in Chiarella.84  In this 
 
 73. Id. at 662 (“Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders.”). 
 74. See infra note 76. 
 75. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. 
Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 77. See, e.g., Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 
1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986)) (“Focusing on the language ‘fraud or deceit upon any person’, we 
have held that the predicate act of fraud may be perpetrated on the source of the nonpublic 
information, even though the source may be unaffiliated with the buyer or seller of 
securities.”); Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032 (2d Cir. 1986) (confirming that the breach of trust 
may be made upon the source of the information and not the buyer or seller of the security in 
order to find liability under Rule 10b-5). 
 78. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 79. A “tender offer” is an offer to all shareholders of a corporation to purchase their 
shares at a premium over market price. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 433.  The objective 
of a tender offer is to obtain a controlling share of the corporation. Id. 
 80. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 648. 
 83. Id. at 652. 
 84. Id. at 652–53 (“The two theories are complementary . . . . The classical theory 
targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; 
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case, the duty owed by O’Hagan was not as one standing in a fiduciary 
relationship to shareholders of Pillsbury, but instead as one bound to the 
expectation of confidentiality of his law firm and its client, Grand 
Metropolitan.85 
A number of cases attempted to define relationships that trigger the duty 
to disclose or abstain from trading under the misappropriation theory.86  In 
response, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2, stating that a duty of trust and 
confidence exists for purposes of the misappropriation theory whenever:  
(1) a person agrees to maintain information in confidence, (2) a history, 
pattern or practice of keeping information confidential exists, or (3) the 
information is shared by a family member, unless the defendant can show 
that there was no expectation to keep the information confidential.87 
Examining the misappropriation theory and its limits uncovers what 
courts view to be the harm from insider trading—the unfairness caused by 
the breach of trust between parties.88  Since liability under 10b-5 requires 
finding “deception,” the misappropriator would need to breach a duty of 
trust to the source of the information and, therefore, make the transactions 
without informing the source of his intention to profit from the confidential 
information.89  This ignores that the trade’s effect on the market would be 
the same regardless of whether the trader informed his source that he 
planned to use the information in this manner.90  The same result would 
occur if the source authorized the trader to use the information.91  These 
examples illustrate that the breach of trust between parties is the main 
concern driving insider trading prohibition. 
b.  Satisfying the Duty to Abstain or Disclose 
When is it appropriate for an inside trader to begin trading on his inside 
information?  Should he wait until there has been a public announcement, 
or is it sufficient to wait until a substantial number of investors have access 
to the information, by a leak of the information or a release to a portion of 
investors?92  The SEC in In re Faberge, Inc.93 suggested a “public access” 
approach:  information must be disclosed “in a manner calculated to reach 
 
the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a 
corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the 
information.”). 
 85. Id. at 653 n.5. 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
a husband-wife relationship was not fiduciary per se as to give rise to a duty to respect 
confidential information); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1035 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(finding liability when a journalist for the Wall Street Journal traded with advance 
knowledge that a stock would get a good review in a later column due to the 
misappropriation of information from the source, the Journal). 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2010); see COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 897–98. 
 88. See infra Part I.A.5.b. 
 89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 90. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 898. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 885. 
 93. Exchange Act Release No. 10,174, 45 SEC Docket 249 (May 25, 1973).  
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the securities market place in general through recognized channels of 
distribution, and public investors must be afforded a reasonable waiting 
period to react to the information.”94  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in United States v. Libera95 found the appropriate approach 
to be whether the material information has been fully impounded into 
market price, on the assumption that the opportunity for wrongful profit has 
passed.96  These cases bear on the determination of what point in time an 
insider trading defendant’s conduct ceases to be illegal.97 
4.  Loss Causation and Damages:  Calculating the Harm Done 
To find liability under Rule 10b-5, a false statement or omission “must 
both ‘cause’ the plaintiff to enter the transaction and ‘cause’ the plaintiff’s 
loss.”98  Losses that are caused by the insider’s transaction are actionable.  
However, factors other than omission, such as general market factors, 
should not be recoverable as damages.99 
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,100 the Supreme Court put a 
limit on the type of damages that could be recovered from a false statement 
or omission.  Dura made false public statements concerning the likelihood 
of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a new asthmatic spray 
device, revealing later that the FDA would not approve the device.101  Once 
the true information was revealed, Dura’s share price temporarily fell but 
almost fully recovered within a week.102 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found liability, requiring 
only a “pleading that the price at the time of purchase was overstated.”103  
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.104  Justice Breyer, writing for 
the Court, rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “inflated purchase price” approach to 
causation of loss.105  The Court reasoned that the fact that the stock price 
was inflated by false statements at the time of purchase was insufficient to 
establish that the false statements actually caused a loss on sales after 
truthful disclosure.106  The Court indicated that the variations of the stock 
market do not themselves cause fraud-related economic loss.107  Therefore, 
the damages that the plaintiff could recover were only those that the 
 
 94. Id. at 255. 
 95. 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 96. Id. at 601. 
 97. Cf. infra notes 396–407 and accompanying text (discussing the Nacchio court’s 
examination of the possible portion of insider gains that is “lawful”); infra Part III.A 
(discussing the problems with using gain to measure culpability). 
 98. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 685. 
 99. Id.; see infra Part III.A. 
 100. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 101. Id. at 339. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 
(2005). 
 104. Dura, 544 U.S. at 338. 
 105. Id. at 345. 
 106. Id. at 342–43. 
 107. Id. 
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defendant’s illegal conduct caused, which ceased once the market absorbed 
the truthful information.108   
Although Dura spoke to loss causation and damages in a civil false 
statement case, courts have applied the same reasoning in criminal 
prosecutions because it sheds light on the point at which damage is done, 
and therefore liability will end—when truthful disclosure cuts off the loss 
causation.109  Once courts determine the point at which loss causation has 
ceased, how courts actually calculate damages in a civil proceeding can also 
be extremely helpful in determining a sentence under the Guidelines, due to 
the similar calculations of a plaintiff’s damages and of the insider’s “gain” 
under the Guidelines.110  Examining civil damages calculations can be used 
as guidance in calculating a sentence under the Guidelines.111 
The majority method to calculate damages used by civil courts is the 
“disgorgement method.”112  The primary purposes of this remedy are to 
deprive a defendant of “ill-gotten gains”113 and to prevent unjust 
enrichment.114  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in SEC v. 
MacDonald115 examined whether a defendant should be required to 
disgorge the entire profits from the sale of securities purchased on the basis 
of insider knowledge or only “an amount representing the increased value 
of the shares at a reasonable time after public dissemination of the 
information,” determining that the district court should analyze the market 
absorption date to provide an appropriate disgorgement amount.116 
The MacDonald court found that any increase in the value of stock after 
the public dissemination of the information could not be attributable to any 
illegal conduct of the defendant.117  Although acknowledging previous 
holdings recognizing that any windfall of a rise in stock price should be for 
the benefit of the defrauded and not the fraudulent party,118 the court also 
recognized that “[t]here are, of course, limits to this principle.”119  The 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 
546 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The civil damage measure should be the backdrop for criminal 
responsibility both because it furnishes the standard of compensable injury for securities 
fraud victims and because it is attuned to stock market complexities.”); infra notes 410–14 
and accompanying text; Part III.A. 
 110. See infra notes 413–15 and accompanying text. 
 111. See, e.g., Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077–80 (relying on civil cases, and specifically the 
disgorgement method of calculating damages, to formulate a method to calculate “gain” for 
the purposes of sentencing). 
 112. See, e.g, SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the district 
court’s plan to distribute disgorged funds absent abuse of discretion); see King, supra note 
46, at 1084. 
 113. Calvo, 378 F.3d at 1217. 
 114. See, e.g., SEC v. Banner Fund Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that 
disgorgement is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment). 
 115. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 116. Id. at 52–55. 
 117. Id. at 52. 
 118. Id. at 53 (quoting Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)). 
 119. Id. (quoting Janigan, 344 F.2d at 787). 
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court found that “the defrauded sellers can recover only those accretions 
occurring up to a reasonable time after they discovered the truth.”120  
Additionally, the court noted that any other method would result in 
inequitable results to similarly situated defendants.121 
The court then determined that there should be a “cut-off date,” at which 
point subsequent profits or losses are considered unrelated to the inside 
trading and, therefore, should not be applied to the disgorgement amount.122 
The court also looked to Texas Gulf for guidance in determining when this 
“cut-off date” should be.123  In examining Texas Gulf, the Court found that 
the period for dissemination and “digestion” of the information into the 
market could be reasonably found to be no longer than one day.124  The 
MacDonald court noted that in the case of the stock with which MacDonald 
was dealing, “the market itself may be the best indicator of how long it took 
for the investing public to learn of, and react to, the disclosed facts.”125  At 
first disclosure the stock price increased; once investors stopped reacting to 
the good news, the stock price leveled off, even if only temporarily.126  The 
court found this price behavior to be evidence of the time at which the 
market ceased reacting to the illegal conduct.127  The disgorgement measure 
of damages has since become the standard measure of damages in both SEC 
actions and private action litigation.128 
5.  Theoretical Underpinnings:  Who Is Harmed by Insider Trading? 
In order to comprehend how insider trading harms society, as well as 
individuals, it is necessary to consider the economic theories underlying 
how markets function when there is trading of insider information. 
a.  Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and Its Critiques 
One of the core working hypotheses of modern financial economics is the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH).129  Although how markets 
 
 120. Id.  The court went on to explain that “[w]hen a fraudulent buyer has reached the 
point of his full gain from the fraud, viz., the market price a reasonable time after the 
undisclosed information has become public, any consequence of a subsequent decision, be it 
to sell or retain the stock, is res inter alios, not causally related to the fraud.” Id. at 54. 
 121. Id. at 54 (“[T]o charge one class of insiders more than others who had committed 
precisely the same fraudulent act does not seem to us to meet any definition of ‘equitable.’”). 
 122. Id.; see also SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974) (“Once public 
disclosure is made and all investors are trading on an equal footing, the violater should take 
the risks of the market himself.”). 
 123. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 54. 
 124. Id. (citing to and discussing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 125. Id. at 55. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); see ALLEN 
ET AL., supra note 14, at 689. 
 129. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 130.  The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH) was introduced by Eugene F. Fama, in his article Efficient Capital Markets:  A 
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function has never been truly agreed upon and continues to be studied, 
securities fraud analysts as well as courts rely on the ECMH as the main 
assumption when attempting to calculate the cause-and-effect “loss” or 
“gain” attributed to a particular fraud.130  The ECMH postulates that prices 
of stock on the market reflect all material information available to the 
public and that this information is quickly assimilated into stock prices.131  
The ECMH focuses on the relationship between stock price and 
information.132  A price is established in an efficient market if the price that 
exists for the security is what it would be if everyone had the same 
information about that security.133  Not every investor has the same opinion 
about the value of the stock, but an efficient market will be the result of all 
investors’ collective decisions, which are based on the same information.134  
The ECMH also holds that material information is rapidly absorbed into the 
market and the price quickly reflects that information upon its public 
dissemination.135  For this to be true, the ECMH assumes that sophisticated 
investors exist who do the required research and trade, so that the 
information is introduced into the market.136  
Although at one point the ECMH was thought to be unassailable,137 the 
theory has been under attack, especially recently, for not properly 
anticipating volatility in the market unrelated to the stock’s intrinsic 
price.138  Market behaviors such as “bubbles” and other evidence of “herd” 
behavior have brought the ECMH’s ability to explain stock prices into 
question.139  Evidence that has been offered to question the ECMH includes 
 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) [hereinafter Fama, Efficient 
Capital Markets], which he followed with Efficient Capital Markets:  II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991). 
 130. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 95 (“[M]any doctrines and SEC regulations are 
premised on the efficient market hypothesis.”); id. at 105 (“[T]he efficient market hypothesis 
is the intellectual framework within which current disclosure policies are formulated and 
their operation assessed.”); infra Part I.A.5.b. 
 131. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 129, at 383–84; see ALLEN ET AL., supra 
note 14, at 130, 683. 
 132. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 129, at 388; see COX ET AL., supra note 
26, at 105. 
 133. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 129, at 387; see COX ET AL., supra note 
26, at 105–06. 
 134. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 106. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 107. 
 137. In 1978, Professor Michael Jensen wrote:  “I believe there is no other proposition in 
economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis.” Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 
J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978). 
 138. See, e.g., Robert M. Daines & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox:  The 
Case for Restructuring Corporate Law, 103 YALE L.J. 577, 614 (1992) (“Legal scholars 
familiar with current financial economics literature agree that there is now reason to doubt 
the efficiency of [securities] markets.”); Ronald H. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Twenty Years Later:  The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); 
Donald Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of Stock Markets:  A Behavioral Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 141 (2002) (“If far from dead, market 
efficiency is at least more contestable than ever.”); see COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 110–15. 
 139. A recent N.Y. Times Magazine article by economist Paul Krugman attacked 
economists’ general reliance on the ECMH and blamed this reliance for the recent economic 
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stock analyst strategies that actually count on “fads and fashions” when 
predicting future stock behavior, representing a belief that stocks are in fact 
mispriced.140  Furthermore, the volume of trading and the volatility of stock 
prices indicate that prices do not reflect the intrinsic value at any given 
moment.141  Many argue that this behavior is more consistent with the view 
that stock prices are determined significantly by investor reaction rather 
than on the actual financial information related to the security.142  
Originally dismissed, economist John Maynard Keynes felt that stock prices 
reflected a collective strategy by investors to assess what the “crowd” 
would do, rather than to assess what the value of the stock was based on the 
company’s assets or future financial performance.143  Some commentators 
are once again embracing Keynes’ ideas.144 
Some scholars point to a relatively new theory, behavioral finance, to 
raise questions about the ECMH.145  The theory suggests that “noise 
traders,” whose trades are motivated by behavioral biases as opposed to 
rational expectations about intrinsic value, influence prices.146  Though the 
ECMH is not discredited, it stands qualified by research supporting the 
view that markets are “noisy”.147  Although the assertion that stock prices 
react quickly to publicly available information is not refuted, “[w]hat 
remains in doubt is how often, and for what duration, stock prices might 
move out of line with fundamental values.”148  This uncertainty makes it 
difficult to calculate “gain” and “loss” precisely and consistently.149 
b.  Who Is Harmed? 
Understanding the harm caused by insider trading is crucial in deciding 
how an insider trading defendant should be penalized.150  Because 
determining the culpability of each particular defendant is necessary to 
 
collapse. Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
Sept. 6, 2009, at 36, 43 (“The spread of the current financial crisis seemed almost like an 
object lesson in the perils of financial instability.”). 
 140. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 111. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND 
MONEY 147–64 (1936); see COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 112. 
 144. See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 139, at 36, 43; see also John Cassidy, Letter from 
Chicago:  After the Blowup, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28 (examining the recent 
change in economic attitude toward a Keynesian ideology by interviewing, among others, 
Judge Richard A. Posner, a leader in the Chicago School of economics, now a reformed 
“Keynesian”). 
 145. See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 139, at 36, 42–43; Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a 
Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 139–41 (2006). 
 146. Ribstein, supra note 145, at 141; see COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 110–13; see infra 
notes 438–44 and accompanying text. 
 147. COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 113. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See infra text accompanying note 445. 
 150. Determining the harm caused will help to determine culpability of the defendant. See 
STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT:  THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIMINALS 20 (1988). 
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dispensing sentences that are uniform and not arbitrary, it is important to 
understand both the practical effects, as well as the degree of harm caused 
by the fraud itself. 
With the ECMH as a strict assumption in determining insider trading 
effects, a theoretical understanding can be reached on how insider trading 
harms participants in the market.  The first conception of why insider 
trading is harmful is that it is “unfair” and undermines public confidence in 
the market.151  Since market prices supposedly reflect all publicly available 
information, undisclosed information should not be used to privately assess 
the stock’s true value.152  Allowing insider trading can impede corporate 
decision making, and tempt insiders to delay public disclosure of valuable 
information.153 
But what is the direct, measurable harm attributed to the crime?  The first 
conception of harm is the idea articulated in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf 
Sulphur:  10b-5 is intended to level the playing field of those trading in 
securities.154  The focus of the equal access theory is the “inherent 
unfairness,” discussed in Cady, Roberts, involved in an insider taking 
advantage of the information that is unavailable to those with whom he is 
trading.155  The injured party under this theory is the individual trader who 
was taken advantage of by the insider.156  The policy being furthered is that 
traders have a “justifiable expectation . . . that all investors . . . have 
relatively equal access to material information.”157  Although the equal 
access theory is no longer a viable method on which to predicate a duty to 
disclose,158 the idea of underlying unfairness has survived in subsequent 
insider trading jurisprudence. 159 
Putting aside the idea that profiting from an informational advantage is 
inherently harmful to other traders, the practical effect of insider trading on 
the market provides additional reasoning to regulate such conduct.  Those 
opposed to the regulation of insider trading, namely Henry Manne, have 
argued that the only effect inside trading has on the market is to move the 
market in the right direction, reflecting the most accurate information.160  If 
this is true, all other traders actually receive a better, more informed price 
 
 151. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under 
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than if the insider had stayed out of the market.161  Essentially, insiders are 
correcting the market price by selling their information to other traders.162  
Therefore, assuming markets are efficient, insider trading will lead to more 
informed prices and may actually increase investor confidence as well as 
the efficiency of the market.163 
However, there are others who may be harmed by the insider trading 
besides the party directly transacting with the insider.  An example 
featuring a corporation with very few shareholders who interact in face-to-
face transactions demonstrates this harm.  Suppose that the president of a 
corporation knows adverse material information about the corporation.164  
The president, betting that the stock price will decrease at disclosure, is 
interested in selling his shares.165  However, an unknowledgeable 
stockholder also desires to sell his shares at the market price, eleven dollars 
per share.166  The president is willing to sell his shares at ten dollars per 
share, and therefore the president preempts the other shareholder’s sale.167  
When the bad news is disclosed, the shareholder is stuck with his shares 
that are now worth only eight dollars per share.  He is made worse off by 
the insider’s trading.168 
Similar harm occurs when the president has good news.169  He will buy 
shares at a higher price than market value, knowing that the price will 
increase when the news is disclosed.170  Therefore, he preempts other 
traders who desire to buy at market price, depriving them of the opportunity 
to profit when the good news is disclosed.171  He also induces current 
shareholders, who would not have sold but for the insider’s offer, to sell 
their stock at the higher price.172  These shareholders have also been 
deprived the opportunity to profit from the disclosure.173 
Analogous harm also occurs in the public stock market.  When a large 
insider purchase increases the stock price, it induces current shareholders to 
sell, missing the opportunity to profit off the inevitable price increase.174  
Similar effects happen when a large insider sale decreases the price.175  
This large sale preempts other sellers who were willing to sell at the higher 
 
 161. MANNE, supra note 23, at 77–110; see Scott, supra note 156, at 807. 
 162. See Scott, supra note 156, at 808. 
 163. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 691–92; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 151, at 
885. 
 164. This example is taken from Wang, supra note 38, at 1222–24. 
 165. Id.  This practice is sometimes referred to as “loss avoidance”:  the insider sells 
anticipating that once the information is disclosed, it will result in a lower stock price. See 
United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1077 n.12 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 166. Wang, supra note 38, at 1222–24. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1235–36. 
 173. Id. at 1236. 
 174. Id. at 1235–37. 
 175. Id. 
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market price.176  These shareholders keep their shares, and are deprived of 
the opportunity to sell before the stock price decreases.177   
B.  The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:  History and Application 
The development of securities fraud case law has shaped courts’ 
understanding of the harm caused by insider trading and other white collar 
offenses and how these offenders should be penalized.  This section 
explores the creation of the Guidelines, how they currently punish white 
collar defendants, and the motivations behind how their methodology came 
to be. 
1.  The Creation of the Sentencing Guidelines and Its Commission 
a.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
Originally, federal sentencing was completely discretionary; there were 
no guidelines or procedures to adhere to except statutory mandatory 
maximum or, in some cases, minimum sentences.178  In 1984, Congress 
passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), drastically reforming the federal 
sentencing process.179  Judge Marvin E. Frankel of the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York was one of the leaders of this reform 
movement.180  Judge Frankel noted that the result of the current system of 
unguided sentences by judges was “a wild array of sentencing judgments 
without any semblance of the consistency demanded by the ideal of equal 
justice.”181  Judge Frankel found that the fate of a defendant was far too 
dependent on the judge that the defendant was assigned to for sentencing.182  
Judge Frankel and others urged for a system of guidance so that all 
similarly situated defendants would be fairly sentenced.183 
With these goals in mind, the SRA established the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (Commission) to create the Guidelines,184 defined the goals of 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5–6 (1973). 
 179. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.; 28 U.S.C.A §§ 991–998 (2006)); see also Michael S. Tunink, 
Comment, A New Role for the United States Sentencing Commission in Post-Booker 
Sentencing:  Reflecting Judicial Practice, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1429, 1431 (2008) (“In 1984, 
Congress passed the SRA in response to criticisms of the uncertainty and lack of uniformity 
in the discretionary sentencing system.”). 
 180. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 178 (noting his concern with the inconsistent 
sentences imposed by federal judges at that time). 
 181. Id. at 7. 
 182. See id. at 6 (“It is even an illicit form of qualification to insert a parenthetical 
‘depending upon the judge’ . . . . For that goes, after all, to the very core of the evil our 
principles denounce.  We claim . . . to have a government of laws, not men.”). 
 183. See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104 (1998) (“Reduction of ‘unwarranted sentencing disparities’ was 
a—probably the—goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.”); Tunink, supra note 179, at 
1431–32. 
 184. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006). 
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punishment,185 and provided appellate review of sentences departing from 
the Guidelines.186  The SRA promoted the development of the Guidelines in 
order to further the basic purposes of criminal punishment, which the Act 
defined to be deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and 
rehabilitation.187  The SRA delegated broad authority to the Commission to 
review federal sentencing.188 
b.  The Role of the Sentencing Commission 
The Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch.189  Its 
principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the 
federal courts that will “assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed 
guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of 
federal crimes.”190 
There were three main reasons for Congress to create an ongoing, 
independent Commission.191  The first was to create a committee of experts 
who would draft reasonable sentencing rules based on their experience.192  
Second, since Congress knew that the first version of sentencing rules 
would not be perfect, the Commission also needed to monitor, evaluate, and 
modify the rules over time.193  The Commission itself describes this process 
as “evolutionary.  It expects, and the governing statute [the SRA] 
anticipates, that continuing research, experience, and analysis will result in 
modifications and revisions to the guidelines through submission of 
amendments to Congress.”194  Finally, Congress realized that the creation 
of reasonable sentencing rules were dependent on the source of these rules 
being insulated from political pressures.195 
2.  Sentencing Insider Trading Under the Guidelines 
The SRA contains congressional directives as to how the sentencing 
ranges should be determined, the most important of which directs the 
Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender 
characteristics.196  The Guidelines calculation has several steps and is based 
on a “point” calculation system.197  These points will calculate a 
defendant’s total “Offense Level” (up to forty-three levels) and “Criminal 
 
 185. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 186. Id. § 3742, invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
 188. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1A1.1–1.2 (2009). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres?  The Curious History and 
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 379 (2004). 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. USSG § 1A1.2. 
 195. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 379–80. 
 196. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006); see USSG § 1A1.2. 
 197. See generally USSG §§ 2–5.j 
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History Category” (up to six categories).198  The intersection of the total 
offense level and criminal history category as designated by a sentencing 
chart199 will give the range of months indicating the defendant’s potential 
sentence.  Where the Guidelines call for imprisonment, the range must be 
narrow.200 
a.  Approach in Drafting Sections 2B1.1 & 2B1.4:  The Loss Chart 
The original approach to providing sentencing ranges for offenses was 
empirical and historical as opposed to philosophical.201  Instead of being 
guided by the purposes of punishment and attempting to draft penalties 
reflecting those purposes, the Commission reproduced the sentencing 
patterns that emerged pre-Guidelines.202  In the case of economic crimes, 
however, the Commission diverted somewhat from this historical 
practice.203  The Commission did not focus heavily on the factors that had 
historically been important to judges in sentencing economic crimes; 
instead, the Commission consciously increased the severity of sentences for 
certain economic crimes to above pre-Guideline levels.204  Before the 
Guidelines, many white collar criminals were given probation—a result that 
the Commission felt was not a sufficient deterrent to future economic 
criminals.205  Consequently, the Commission made sure that white collar 
criminals would be given a “short but definite period of confinement” 
instead of probation.206  Therefore, the Commission identified one factor as 
the most relevant in sentencing white collar criminals:  the amount of 
monetary “loss” or “gain” resulting from the offense.207 
This heavy reliance on “loss” and “gain” resulted in extreme 
sentences.208  In attempting to avoid giving probation, courts have given 
white collar defendants severe sentences for their crimes.209  Judge Jed S. 
 
 198. See id. §§ 1B1.1, 5A. 
 199. Id. § 5A. 
 200. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2); see USSG § 1A1.2 (“[T]he maximum of the range cannot 
exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25 percent of the minimum or six 
months.”). 
 201. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 385. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id.; see also John Hagan & Ilene Nagel Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of 
Upperworld and Underworld Crime in Ten Federal District Courts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
467, 475 (1979) (quoting a U.S. Attorney in one district who stated that almost all white 
collar criminals would receive probation if not for plea bargaining). 
 206. Steven Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22 (1988). 
 207. See, Bowman, supra note 191, at 386. 
 208. See id.; see also Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 279, 279 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/02/21/podgor.html (arguing that 
sentences imposed upon white collar criminals are inappropriately severe). 
 209. E.g., Ken Belson, WorldCom Head Is Given 25 Years for Huge Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 2005, at A1 (announcing the twenty-five year prison sentence imposed on 
WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers); Robert Farzad, Jail Terms for 2 at Top of Adelphia, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 21, 2005, at C1 (announcing the sentences of two officials of Adelphia 
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Rakoff of the Southern District of New York spoke out at the sentencing 
hearing of a defendant about his feeling that the “loss” chart resulted in an 
unreasonable sentence for the defendant: 
What drove the Government’s calculation in this case, more than any 
other single factor, was the inordinate emphasis that the Sentencing 
Guidelines place in fraud cases on the amount of actual or intended 
financial loss.  As many have noted, the Sentencing Guidelines, because 
of their arithmetic approach and also in an effort to appear “objective,” 
tend to place great weight on putatively measurable quantities . . . 
without, however, explaining why it is appropriate to accord such huge 
weight to such factors. . . . Since successful public companies typically 
issue millions of publicly traded shares . . . the precipitous decline in 
stock price that typically accompanies a revelation of fraud generates a 
multiplier effect that may lead to guideline offense levels that are, quite 
literally, off the chart.210 
Scholars join Judge Rakoff in his feeling that the Guidelines result in 
extreme sentences that may or may not be related to the defendant’s 
culpability.211  
Chapter 2B prescribes the sentences for offenders of “Basic Economic 
Offenses” based on this “loss”-focused approach.212  The Chapter Two 
provision that prescribes the sentence for insider trading offenders is 
2B1.4.213  The section is quite sparse, including only a “base offense level” 
and an instruction to apply additional offense levels based on a “loss” chart 
found in 2B1.1.214  Section 2B1.1 prescribes progressively greater increases 
to the offense level based on the relevant amount of loss (or, in insider 
trading cases, “gain”).215  The loss chart includes categories for loss starting 
at $5000 up to $400 million.216  The increase in offense level according to 
this chart could be anywhere between two levels and thirty levels.217  The 
result of this calculation, assuming the defendant is in criminal history 
 
Communications Corporation:  eighty-year-old John Rigas was sentenced to fifteen years, 
and his son Timothy Rigas was sentenced to twenty years). 
 210. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 183, at 69).  The “chart” that Judge Rakoff referred to is the “loss” 
chart included in 2B1.1 of the Guidelines. 
 211. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 183, at 97–98; Podgor, supra note 208, 
at 279. 
 212. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B (2009). 
 213. Before November 2001, insider trading fell under section 2F1.1, and many cases 
refer to this section as section 2F1.1.  As of November 2001, section 2F1.1 was deleted and 
its provisions were combined with section 2B1.4. See King, supra note 46, at 1093 n.442. 
 214. USSG § 2B1.4. 
 215. Id. § 2B1.1. 
 216. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 217. Id. 
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category I (as many white collar defendants are),218 could be a sentence 
difference of up to twenty-four years.219 
The commentary of 2B1.4 is vague: 
This guideline applies to certain violations of Rule 10b-5 that are 
commonly referred to as “insider trading”.  Insider trading is treated 
essentially as a sophisticated fraud.  Because the victims and their losses 
are difficult if not impossible to identify, the gain, i.e., the total increase in 
value realized through trading in securities by the defendant and persons 
acting in concert with the defendant or to whom the defendant provided 
inside information, is employed instead of the victims’ losses.220 
The interpretation of the phrase “total increase in value” has been 
contested in the courts.221  The commentary in 2B1.1 attempts to give 
further guidance on how to calculate gain:  “The court shall use the gain 
that resulted from the offense . . . .”222  The courts have looked to both areas 
of the commentary for guidance in calculating “gain.”223 
The method of calculating loss or gain under 2B1.1 is highly dispositive 
in determining a sentence, regardless of statutory maximums that are 
included in some of the statutes under which insider trading is 
prosecuted.224  This is due to the way that the Guidelines handle multiple 
counts of conviction, by grouping offenses.225  If the Guidelines prescribe a 
life sentence, the court will stack the maximum sentences for each count of 
conviction.226  Therefore, the Guideline sentence reached by calculating 
“gain” is almost always imposed, regardless of statutory maximums.  The 
method of calculating “gain” under this section of the Guidelines is the 
 
 218. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION’S SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, tbl. 14 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/Table14.pdf 
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sentencing range at offense level 38—prescribing a range of 235–239 months—with the low 
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 220. Id. § 2B1.4 cmt. n.1. 
 221. See infra Part II. 
 222. USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B). 
 223. See infra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 224. See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text. 
 225. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 352 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Thus, where 
multiple convictions are involved, Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.2(d) ordinarily requires a 
district court to impose consecutive statutory maximum sentences to the extent necessary to 
fashion a sentence within the range of ‘total punishment’ set forth by the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”) (citing USSG § 5G1.2(d) (2000), which, in the most current version, USSG 
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 226. For an example of how the court will stack these individual statutory maximums to 
result in a sentence, see Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1, which includes a chart displaying the statutory maximums that 
were added to come to a final sentence of 150 years when the Guidelines prescribed a life 
sentence. 
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resulting conflict discussed in Part II of this Note.  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Mooney,227 interprets the 
2B1.4 instruction to mean that the defendant should be sentenced based on 
the net profit achieved through all trading of inside information.228  
Alternatively, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United 
States v. Nacchio,229 finds that the “gain resulting from the offense” should 
be cut off at the point at which disclosure has caused the market to absorb 
the information and therefore cuts off any unlawful gains.230  The two 
methods can often lead to very different sentences for the same defendant. 
b.  The Incremental Approach 
The “loss” chart is unique in the Guidelines in that it takes a precise 
incremental approach to determining culpability.231  This is an approach 
that has been criticized for being complex and rigid.232  Judge Jon O. 
Newman of the Second Circuit recently attacked the loss chart at Public 
Hearings held by the Commission.233  Judge Newman takes issue with the 
loss chart’s premise that “every minute increment of offense conduct must 
result in a minute increment of punishment.”234  His theory is that there is 
no relevant difference related to culpability between a burglar who steals 
$4000 and one who steals $6000, depending only on what amount is 
available for theft.235 
Judge Newman postulates that the Guidelines have taken this approach 
because continuity is preferable to large “cliffs” of categories.236  In other 
words, one continuous curve increasing the sentence of a defendant 
gradually is preferable to two or three levels with large gaps of loss amount 
 
 227. 425 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 228. Id. at 1100; see infra notes 346–52 and accompanying text.  
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 230. Id. at 1072; see infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text. 
 231. See U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2009).  The only other 
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 234. Id. at 5. 
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separating each.237  Judge Newman claims that although this method “is a 
statistician’s dream . . . it is a sentencing judge’s nightmare.”238 
Judge Newman points out that one of the many “unfortunate 
consequences” of this incremental approach is that it “create[s] an illusion 
of precision that is divorced from reality.”239  Requiring judges to find a 
precise number and sentence a defendant mainly based on that number 
gives the perception that each defendant has been sentenced accordingly 
compared to other defendants with different amounts of loss or gain.240  
Judge Newman claims that “in reality there are so many variables in 
determining losses and so many problems in gathering evidence that the 
loss figures used for determining punishment in many cases will at best 
only approximate the true (and often unknowable) loss amounts.”241 
Other commentators agree that determining the “loss” or “gain” amount 
in a securities fraud or insider trading case is not an exact science, and in 
fact many other factors, unrelated to a defendant’s criminal activity, may 
add to the rise or fall of a stock price.242  It is for this reason that reaching a 
precise figure to satisfy the Guidelines calculation may be an unattainable 
goal.243 
3.  Post-Booker:  Do the Guidelines Still Matter? 
Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they still play an 
important role in determining the sentence of a defendant.  This section 
briefly discusses the successful constitutional attack on the Guidelines and 
their role in sentencing today. 
In United States v. Booker,244 the Court held that the Guidelines are a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by jury.245  In Booker, 
the district court had imposed a sentence greater than the original 
Guidelines sentence because of the post-trial finding by the court that the 
defendant had been in possession of additional grams of crack and had 
obstructed justice.246  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that all facts 
used to impose a sentence must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.247  In the first of a two-part plurality opinion, Justice John Paul 
Stevens reasoned that, because the Guidelines were mandatory, they had the 
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 242. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Editorial, Should the Stock Market Be the 
Sentencing Judge?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2004, at A15. 
 243. See id. 
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“force and effect of laws” and therefore implicated the Sixth 
Amendment.248 
In the second part of the opinion, Justice Breyer discussed the remedy for 
the Sixth Amendment violation, which was to sever and excise the parts of 
the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory, thus making them 
“effectively advisory.”249  The remainder of the statute kept appellate 
review in place under a reasonableness standard.250 
Although advisory, the Guidelines calculation is still procedurally 
required before imposing a sentence.251  A procedural error warranting 
reversal of a sentence on appeal is “failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the Guidelines range.”252  The SRA still requires every federal 
sentencing judge to start the process of selecting a sentence by determining 
the Guidelines calculation.253  Only after making that calculation may the 
judge exercise discretion.254  It follows that, although not mandatory on 
district courts, the interpretation of the Guidelines is still a dispositive 
matter of law for convicted defendants. 
Additionally, departing from the Guidelines, although permissible, must 
be justified either under Chapter Five of the Guidelines or 18 U.S.C. 
Section 3553(a).255  First, if a particular case presents especially atypical 
features, the Guidelines allow the court to grant a departure and sentence 
outside the prescribed range under Chapter Five.256  The SRA permits a 
court to depart from the Guidelines sentence only when it finds “an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from 
that described.”257  However, Chapter Five lists several factors that the 
court may not take into account as grounds for departure (e.g., race, sex, 
national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status, lack of guidance as a 
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youth, drug or alcohol dependence or abuse, coercion and duress, post-
sentencing rehabilitative efforts).258  Therefore, the instances where a 
Chapter Five departure is permissible are limited. 
A court is also entitled to consider factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
Section 3553(a) in order to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary.”259  Section 3553(a) is written with the purposes of 
punishment and the goals of our criminal justice system in mind.260  Every 
court must consider the Section 3553(a) factors when determining a 
sentence, whether it is within or outside the Guidelines-prescribed 
sentence.261  These factors are extremely broad, and may be interpreted to 
include an unlimited number of considerations.262  Therefore, a large gap is 
created between the standard for imposing a Guideline departure (found in 
U.S.S.G. Section 5) and the standard for imposing a non-Guideline sentence 
(justified by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors).263  It is for this reason that the 
Commission is much more rigorous in analyzing the rates of non-Guideline 
sentences within a district than it is in analyzing the Guidelines departures.  
Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) departures are applied sparingly.264 
When looking specifically at fraud offenses, statistics confirm the 
continuing importance of, and dependence on, the Guidelines for 
sentencing.265  The statistical reports provided by the Commission provide 
information by offense of all non-Guidelines sentences nationally.266  The 
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. to reflect the seriousness of the offense”; the need to deter others from similar conduct; and 
other similar factors). 
 263. See supra notes 255–62 and accompanying text. 
 264. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION’S SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, tbl. 27 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/Table27.pdf 
(indicating that the percentage of total above or below range sentences is approximately 14% 
nationally for all crimes). 
 265. See id. 
 266. E.g., id. 
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relevant inquiry is on non-government sponsored departures.267  In 2009, 
the percentage of total cases in which a judge awarded a discretionary non-
Guidelines sentence totaled only 19.5% of fraud convictions.268  Therefore, 
the Guidelines are still important in determining the actual sentence given. 
C.  The Development of White Collar Criminal Penalties:  Legislative 
History and Current Events 
The legislative history of the white collar Guidelines provisions 
demonstrates the power Congress had in affecting the evolution of 
sentencing policy.  Since the Guidelines are meant to be shaped by an 
independent Commission insulated from political pressures,269 the review 
by Congress of the Guidelines270 and their directives to the Commission 
create a philosophical tension.  An examination of the history of the white 
collar provisions of the Guidelines illuminates this tension. 
The first Guidelines were enacted in 1987, including a “loss” chart for 
economic crimes.271  During the next nine years, the “loss” chart was 
modified almost annually.272  Each amendment tended to increase the 
sentence ranges and make the Guidelines more and more complex.273  Even 
with these amendments, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and other 
organizations still debated whether the current sentencing regime was 
strong enough.274  They felt that sentences for the white collar criminal on 
the higher end of the spectrum remained too low and did not reflect the 
seriousness of the offense.275  The result of this debate was a five-year 
collaborative effort to reform these portions of the Guidelines.276  This 
collaboration produced the 2001 Economic Crime Package of Guideline 
amendments.277  One of these amendments was to modify the “loss” chart 
 
 267. Government sponsored departures are given for cooperation or other circumstances. 
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2009) (awarding government 
sponsored departures for “Substantial Assistance”); id. § 5K3.1 (awarding government 
sponsored departures for “Early Disposition” of certain crimes in certain fast track districts).  
Since a judge is not applying his or her discretion in sentencing under a government 
sponsored departure, these numbers are not indicative in showing how judges use the 
Guidelines to sentence. 
 268. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION’S SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, 
tbl. 27 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/Table27.pdf (applying the 
categories “Above Range w/ Booker,” “Remaining Above Range,” “Below Range w/ Booker,” 
and “Remaining Below Range”). 
 269. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 271. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 378. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. 
 274. See id. at 387–88. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. at 388. 
 277. See id. See generally Frank O. Bowman III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime 
Sentencing Reforms:  An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5 (2001) 
(summarizing the collaborative efforts that produced the 2001 Economic Crime Package, 
and the amendments included within the package). 
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to increase total offense level enhancements.278  Other amendments 
included an extended definition of “loss” as well as modification to some 
specific offense characteristics.279 
Although the amendments encompassed in the 2001 Economic Crime 
Package were agreed upon by all interested parties,280 the events of 2001 
and 2002 changed the attitude of the political community drastically.  On 
December 2, 2001, Enron became the largest company to declare 
bankruptcy after fabricating profits with help from accounting firm Arthur 
Anderson.281  Later, dozens of other companies also showed strong 
evidence of reporting violations.282  In 2002, WorldCom’s CEO and CFO 
were found to have overstated earnings, and the company surpassed Enron 
to become the largest company to declare bankruptcy.283  CEO Bernard 
Ebbers was later sentenced to twenty-five years in prison as a result.284  
These troubling economic circumstances had severe effects on the 
American economy; America had become “a nation of investors whose 
dreams of retirement for themselves and education for their children are 
intertwined with the fate of the stock of the corporations.”285  Losses to 
investors and employees of these corporations were in the billions.286  
Furthermore, investor confidence in these institutions was severely 
undermined.287  After these events, there was heavy pressure on Congress 
to restore confidence in the health and trustworthiness of the stock 
market.288 
During 2002, the Senate and the Bush administration focused on drafting 
both criminal and civil responses to the corporate scandals.289  On June 19, 
2002, then-Senator Joseph R. Biden scheduled a series of congressional 
hearings exploring the topic entitled “Are We Really Getting Tough on 
White Collar Crime?”290  All participants reached the consensus that 
investigative and prosecutorial responses, not increased sentences, were 
 
 278. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 388. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2000), with USSG § 2B1.1 (2001). 
 279. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 389. Compare USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.2 (2000), with 
USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.2 (2001). 
 280. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 390. 
 281. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 9; Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy:  Proceeding Is Biggest Ever in the U.S., With Assets of Just 
Under $50 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A3. 
 282. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 9–10. 
 283. See id. at 10; Peter J. Henning, White Collar Sentences After Booker:  Was the 
Sentencing of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757, 759 (2006); supra 
note 209. 
 284. See Henning, supra note 283, at 757; see also supra note 209. 
 285. Bowman, supra note 191, at 392. 
 286. See id.; Smith, supra note 281. 
 287. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 392. 
 288. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. 5498 (2002) (comments of Rep. Kanjorski & Rep. Oxley); 
see also Bowman, supra note 191, at 393. 
 289. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 393. 
 290. Penalties for White Collar Crime:  Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar 
Crime?:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 
107th Cong. (2002), reprinted in part in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 234 (2003). 
2010] THE MORE YOU GAIN, THE MORE YOU LOSE 195 
needed going forward.291  However, on July 9, 2002, President George W. 
Bush gave a speech in New York City calling for “tough new criminal 
penalties for corporate fraud.”292  Although the DOJ had only recently 
expressed its satisfaction with the Guideline amendments enacted as part of 
the 2001 Economic Crime Package, Congress responded to the President’s 
speech by immediately pushing for new legislation.293  Republicans and 
Democrats competed to offer the toughest proposals for white collar 
criminal legislation.294 
The resulting legislation was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).295  
SOX created new substantive offenses and increased statutory maximum 
sentences for existing economic crimes.296  Most importantly, SOX also 
included specific and general directives to the Commission.297  Specifically, 
the Commission had 180 days to enact the requested amendments to the 
Guidelines.298  SOX section 805 required the Commission to increase 
sentences for crimes involving fraud and obstruction of justice, with 
specific reference to 2B1.1;299 SOX section 905 and section 1104 more 
generally asked the Commission to review the severity of the sentences for 
certain types of economic crimes.300  Further, SOX section 905(a) insisted 
that the “Commission shall review and, as appropriate, amend the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines . . . consider[ing] the extent to which the guidelines 
and policy statements . . . are adequate in view of the statutory increases in 
penalties contained in [SOX].”301  The Commission was left with these 
directives to interpret and implement in order to enhance the sentences for 
white collar crimes.302 
Within the required 180 days, the Commission released on January 25, 
2003 a supplement to the 2002 Guidelines.303  The supplement included a 
modified “loss” chart in 2B1.1.304  Compared with the “loss” chart from the 
 
 291. See id. at 237; Bowman, supra note 191, at 395. 
 292. Dan Collins, Text of Bush Speech on Business Crime:  President Promises Action 
Against Corporate Criminals, CBSNEWS (July 9, 2002), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/07/09/national/main514592.shtml; see Bowman, 
supra note 191, at 398. 
 293. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 400. 
 294. See id. 
 295. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
 296. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 403–05. 
 297. SOX §§ 805, 905, 1104; see Bowman, supra note 191, at 405. 
 298. See SOX §§ 805(b), 905(c), 1104(c). 
 299. See id. § 805(a). 
 300. See id. §§ 905, 1104; see also Bowman, supra note 191, at 409. 
 301. SOX § 905(a). 
 302. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 411 (stating that the SOX directives “raised the 
fundamental questions of whether Congress wanted the Commission to exercise its 
independent, expert judgment in incorporating [SOX] into existing sentencing law, and of 
whether, and if so to what degree, Congress was prepared to defer to the Commission’s 
judgment.”). 
 303. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Supplement to the 2002 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002suppa/2002supp.htm. 
 304. See id. § 2B1.1. 
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2002 Guidelines,305 the modified loss chart raised the number of offense 
levels based on “loss.”  This emergency-modified “loss” chart remains the 
current version of 2B1.1.306 
In March 2003, the Commission held public hearings to debate the new 
amendments, as well as other proposed amendments to the 2003 
Guidelines.307  The DOJ continued to insist on higher sentences, threatening 
to go to Congress with requests for “draconian” mandatory sentences.308  
Although resistant to further increases, the Commission acquiesced to the 
DOJ as a compromise preferable to legislation proscribing mandatory 
sentences.309  The 2003 Guidelines, released on November 1, 2003, 
increased the base offense level of 2B1.1 offenses from 6 to 7.310  Few 
meaningful modifications have been made to the economic crime 
provisions since these critical political events.311 
Often due to the circumstances under which the “loss” chart has evolved, 
many have criticized the white collar provisions of the Guidelines for 
prescribing sentences that are too extreme.312  The “loss” chart in 2B1.1 is 
now the most determinate factor in sentencing a white collar defendant.313  
Since the difference in amount of “loss” or “gain” could mean the 
difference between a life sentence and only a few months in prison, 
defendants often vigorously contest the Government’s finding of amount of 
“loss” or “gain.”  As a result, courts have struggled to define a competent 
method to calculate “loss” or “gain,” especially when that loss or gain is 
based on a change in a public stock price.  Part II examines the methods 
that two circuit courts have adopted for calculating “gain” in an insider 
trading case. 
II.  APPLYING THE GUIDELINES TO INSIDER TRADING:  HOW COURTS 
CALCULATE “GAIN” UNDER SECTION 2B1.4 
Part II of this Note examines the methods used by two circuit courts to 
calculate the amount of “gain” attributed to an insider trading defendant’s 
conduct in order to determine the appropriate Guideline sentence under 
2B1.4 and 2B1.1.  Before 2009, the Eighth Circuit determined “gain” by 
calculating the net profit made by the defendant on the purchase and 
subsequent sale of the stocks in question.314  Part II.A of this Note 
examines the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and opinion.  In July 2009, the 
 
 305. See USSG § 2B1.1 (2002). 
 306. Compare id., with USSG § 2B1.1 (2009). 
 307. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 431. 
 308. Bowman, supra note 191, at 431. 
 309. See Bowman, supra note 191, at 431. 
 310. Compare USSG § 2B1.1 (2002), with USSG § 2B1.1 (2003). 
 311. Compare USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2B1.4 (2003), with USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2B1.4 (2009). 
 312. See, e.g., Podgor, supra note 208; Jenkins, supra note 242, at A15; supra notes 209–10 
and accompanying text. 
 313. See USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2B1.4 (2009); supra Part I.A.2.a. 
 314. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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Tenth Circuit created a split among the circuits315 when the court reversed 
the sentence of an insider trading defendant and ordered the district court to 
calculate “gain” using a method that would instead reflect the point in time 
when the market absorbed the inside information.316  This decision was 
only the second instance in which a circuit addressed the calculation of 
“gain” since 2005.317  Part II.B further draws out the reasoning of the Tenth 
Circuit, as well as examines the district court’s treatment of the “market 
absorption” method on remand. 
A.  United States v. Mooney:  The Net Profit Approach 
1.  Background 
In 2005, the Eighth Circuit was the first circuit court to address the 
definition of calculating “gain” under U.S.S.G. section 2B1.4 and section 
2B1.1 in the sentencing of Michael Alan Mooney.318  Mooney was 
convicted of eight counts of mail fraud, five counts of money laundering, 
and four counts of securities fraud.319  Mooney was the former vice 
president of underwriting for United Healthcare Corporation (United).320  In 
early 1995, Mooney was involved in negotiations entered into by United 
and MetraHealth (Metra), a privately owned company, in an effort by 
United to acquire Metra.321  Success of the deal would have resulted in 
United becoming the largest health care services company in the United 
States.322  During the negotiations, Mooney attended due diligence-related 
confidential meetings on behalf of United.323  During these meetings, 
Mooney and others looked through Metra’s confidential financial records 
and projections.324  United’s corporate counsel informed all participants 
that they were not to trade in stock during the due diligence period and that 
they were to protect the secrecy of the proceedings.325 
Ignoring this instruction from corporate counsel, Mooney contacted his 
stockbroker to sell United common stock and to use the proceeds to 
purchase call options326 in United stock, giving him the right to buy shares 
 
 315. See Douglas A. Berman, Tenth Circuit Reverses Nacchio’s Sentence While 
Thoughtfully Discussing Federal Fraud Sentencing, SENT’G. L. & POL’Y. (July 31, 2009, 
12:03 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2009/07/tenth-circuit-
reverses-nacchios-sentence-while-thoughtfully-discussing-federal-fraud-sentencing-.html. 
 316. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1086 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 317. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093; see also Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1069 (“United States v. 
Mooney appears to be the only circuit decision squarely deciding the issue of gain under the 
insider trading sentencing guideline . . . .”). 
 318. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093. 
 319. Id. at 1095. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 1096. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. An option is a type of derivative, which is a financial instrument whose value 
depends on the price of some underlying instrument. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 103.  
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of stock at a price of thirty-five dollars per share.327  On June 22, 1995, the 
Wall Street Journal reported speculation about United’s acquisition of 
Metra,328 and a few days later on June 26, United publicly announced its 
agreement to acquire Metra.329  The stock price rose as follows:  on June 20 
(before the announcements) the stock traded at $40.125 per share; by July 
15 the price was $44.50 per share; by October 5 the price was over $49.00 
per share.330  Mooney subsequently exercised his call options on July 14, 
October 4 and October 5, netting a total profit of $274,199.46.331 
In response to Mooney’s aggressive purchases of United call options 
prior to the announcements, the SEC began an investigation into his trading 
activities.332  On August 2, 1999, the SEC filed a civil action against 
Mooney, alleging that he had purchased call options while in possession of 
material nonpublic information regarding the proposed merger.333  The 
SEC’s civil action was stayed when he was indicted on criminal charges.334 
At his criminal proceedings, Mooney was found guilty by a jury on all 
counts.335  Mooney was sentenced on August 21, 2002 under the then-
mandatory Guidelines.336  After determining the base offense level by 
grouping the offenses of mail fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering, 
the court then determined the additional levels to be attributed to his illegal 
“gain” from the offense.337  The district court found the gain from the 
insider trading to be $274,199.46 under 2B1.4.338  The court determined 
 
“Options are rights to buy or sell securities from or to another at some predetermined price 
and date.  (Call options are the rights to buy; put options are rights to sell.).” Id.  Options are 
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opportunity for profit. Id. 
 327. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1096. 
 328. Leslie Scism & Ron Winslow, United Healthcare in Talks to Purchase MetraHealth, 
WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995, at A3; see Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1096–97. 
 329. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1097. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 1096 n.2. 
 332. Id. at 1097. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id.  The district court decided to apply the 1994 Guidelines as opposed to the 2002 
Guidelines “[b]ecause the federal sentencing guidelines in effect in 2002 would have 
resulted in a higher sentencing range for the amount of gain found to have resulted from his 
offenses.” Id.  Due to this decision, the court added two additional levels to the base offense 
level representing a gain between $200,000 and $350,000 in illegal proceeds. Id. at 1098; see 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) (1994).  If Mooney had been 
sentenced under the current Guidelines, his total offense level increase based on a gain of 
$274,199.46 would have been instead an increase of twelve levels. See USSG § 2B1.1 
(2009).  The applicable provision of section 2B1.4 “is identical in both versions except for 
the use of gender neutral language in 2002,” and therefore the discussion interpreting “gain” 
under this section is relevant under the current Guidelines as well. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 
1097. Compare USSG § 2F1.2 (1994), with USSG § 2B1.4 (2002), with USSG § 2B1.4 
(2009). 
 337. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1097; see supra note 336. 
 338. See Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098; USSG § 2B1.4 (1994). 
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that the final total offense level was 21, which increased his sentence range 
to 37–46 months.339  He was sentenced to 42 months.340 
2.  Mooney’s Argument to Re-sentence Using the Market Absorption 
Method 
On appeal, Mooney argued that the gain from his insider trading was 
much less than what the district court had found.341  Mooney argued that his 
“gain” for the purposes of sentencing should not be determined by the 
actual proceeds of his sale of the options but instead by the market 
absorption approach based on the disgorgement method used in civil insider 
trading cases.342  Mooney’s argument was that the market would have 
reasonably absorbed his inside information by June 28, 2005, two days after 
United announced its Metra acquisition, and that the information would 
have reflected the true value of his call options on that date.343  If this were 
the case, his gain would have been measured at $50,467.47, changing his 
sentencing range to 24–30 months.344  Mooney argued that his later sales of 
call options should not be considered in calculating gain since the later 
gains were a result of normal market fluctuations of the market and 
independent of any inside information he possessed.345 
3.  Majority Opinion 
The court began its inquiry346 by examining the plain language of 2B1.4 
describing “the gain resulting from the offense.”347  The court found the 
phrase to be “simple and straightforward.  The guideline refers to the 
defendant’s gain, not to market gain, and it ties gain to the defendant’s 
 
 339. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098; USSG § 5A. 
 340. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098.  If Mooney had been sentenced under the current 
Guidelines using the net profit calculation approach taken by the court, the total offense level 
would have been 31, and the range prescribed by the Guidelines would have been 108–135 
months. USSG § 5A (2009); see supra note 336. 
 341. Reply Brief and Supplemental Addendum of Appellant at 1, United States v. 
Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 02-3388). 
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June 28 was due to ordinary market forces, and not due to Mr. Mooney’s alleged information 
advantage.”); see also id. at 2–4 (arguing that the calculation method and reasoning in SEC 
v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc), should be applied in this criminal 
case); supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text. 
 343. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098–99. 
 344. Id. at 1099.  Under the current Guidelines, this “gain” figure would have led to an 
increase in total offense level of six levels, equaling a total offense level of 25. USSG § 
2B1.1.  Therefore, a sentence based on the market absorption method under the current 
Guidelines would have been 57–71 months. Id. § 5A.  Thus, under the current Guidelines, 
the difference in sentence based on net profit versus the market absorption method for 
Mooney would have been more than fifty months, or over four years. See supra note 340. 
 345. Reply Brief and Supplemental Addendum of Appellant, supra note 341, at 1–2.  
 346. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099 (“In interpreting the guidelines, we start with the plain 
language of the guideline itself.”) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 335 F.3d 793, 
797 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 347. USSG § 2B1.4 (2002). 
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offense.”348  In order for Mooney’s theory to be adopted, the court 
maintained, the language would have to include reference to the “market 
value” or some other indication that the value in the market was dispositive 
in calculating gain.349  The court went next in its analysis to the 
commentary to 2B1.4 in order to strengthen its argument.350  The court 
pointed to the area of the commentary indicating that “[b]ecause the victims 
and their losses are difficult if not impossible to identify, the gain, i.e., the 
total increase in value realized through trading in securities by the 
defendant” is used to calculate gain.351  The court found the “total increase 
in value realized” language to be clearly referring to the in-pocket gains 
resulting from trading in securities.352 
Furthermore, the court specifically rejected using victims’ losses as a 
proxy for a gain calculation.353  In the court’s opinion, using a market 
absorption method would be an attempt at estimating the harm caused to a 
trader of United stock during the time that Mooney traded based on his 
material, nonpublic information and would therefore be “inappropriate in 
the criminal context.”354 
The court also rejected Mooney’s argument that the civil law 
disgorgement method should apply to his sentencing calculation.355  The 
court found that had the Commission intended for civil remedies to be 
applied in the context of sentencing, there would be support for this 
inference in the Guidelines or the commentary.356  Furthermore, the court 
noted a greater need for clear rules in the criminal context, as opposed to 
the more extensive fact-finding associated with civil cases.357 
Finding bright line rules to be preferable to a complex system of 
calculation, the court rejected Mooney’s reliance on MacDonald.358  The 
court strongly felt that “[i]mprecise standards” are inappropriate to apply to 
a criminal case.359  Because the interpretation that the district court had 
applied to 2B1.4 provides courts a “simple, accurate, and predictable rule,” 
the court adopted this net profit approach as the applicable test in the Eighth 
Circuit.360 
 
 348. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099. 
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 350. Id. (“The official commentary to § 2B1.4 makes the meaning of the guideline very 
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 351. Id. (quoting USSG § 2B1.4 cmt. background). 
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 353. Id. at 1100. 
 354. Id. at 1101. 
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 356. See id. at 1099. 
 357. Id. at 1101. 
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4. Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Myron H. Bright issued a strong dissent and was the first circuit 
judge to insist on an application of the market absorption rule.361  Judge 
Bright first attacked the majority’s interpretation of the plain language of 
the Guidelines, specifically the interpretation of the phrase “gain resulting 
from the offense.”362  Rather than focusing on the “resulting” language as 
the majority did, Judge Bright instead focused on the language “from the 
offense,” insisting that the court must first determine “what ‘the offense’ 
is.”363  Judge Bright insisted that simply focusing on the “gain” of the 
defendant would translate to all the defendant’s stock gains over the 
lifespan of the defendant’s trading activity.364  This conclusion, reasoned 
Judge Bright, cannot stand.365 
The “offense” in the particular case of Mooney was not the purchase of 
the stock itself but Mooney’s “use of a manipulative or deceptive 
contrivance in connection with the purchase.”366  Therefore, the offense is 
not the purchase and sale of the security but instead the “deception” used to 
profit from the purchases and subsequent sales.367  In essence, Judge Bright 
attempted to sever the “gain” into total gain (or net profit) and gain 
attributed only to the “deception” and therefore to the offense itself.368  This 
gain attributed to the deception “stops when the deception stops, though 
there may be later gain (or loss) as the stock market gyrates along, 
unmolested by any deception.”369 
Judge Bright further explained that the majority’s interpretation of the 
language of 2B1.4 would be inconsistent with the overall goals of 
punishment furthered by the Commission and required by statute.370  One 
of the main motivations behind the SRA and the Guidelines themselves was 
to further uniformity of the sentences of similarly situated defendants.371  
With that in mind, Judge Bright concluded that the majority’s interpretation 
would result in unequal sentences for defendants who had committed the 
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same crime, thus contravening the purposes of the SRA.372  Since it would 
be unreasonable to apply the Guidelines in a manner that would lead to 
disparate sentences, Judge Bright concluded that the majority’s 
interpretation was erroneous.373 
Finally, Judge Bright found the disgorgement remedy applied in the civil 
case Dura to be highly persuasive in the criminal context.374  Judge Bright 
concluded that since the Supreme Court had recognized in a civil context 
that certain “ups and downs” of the market do not affect the amount of loss 
to a victim of deception caused by the fraud, that “obvious concept” should 
apply even more strongly in a criminal case when imposing a sentence of 
incarceration.375  Therefore, Judge Bright concluded that isolating the 
precise gain caused by criminal activity was crucial to determining the 
appropriate sentence.376 
Although the majority did not agree, Judge Bright’s and Mooney’s 
arguments were reconsidered in 2009 by the Tenth Circuit in United States 
v. Nacchio.377 
B.  United States v. Nacchio:  The Market Absorption Method 
1.  Background 
Joseph Nacchio was the former CEO of Qwest Communications 
International, Inc.378  During the second quarter of 2001, Nacchio entered 
into an automatic sales plan to exercise 10,000 options a day at a minimum 
price of thirty-eight dollars per share or higher.379  During this time, 
Nacchio possessed information that Qwest’s first and second quarter 
earnings reports were inflated, and that there was a legitimate risk that 
Qwest would not meet its year-end projections.380  However, Nacchio 
continued exercising his options without disclosing this information 
through May 2001, when the stock price dropped below thirty-eight dollars 
per share and remained there, thus ending Nacchio’s trading activity.381  In 
July 2001, Qwest issued a press release reporting the financial results for 
the second quarter, and, in August 2001, disclosed the magnitude of the 
non-recurring revenue and how it would affect future projections.382  
 
 372. Id.  Also, see supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text for a similar hypothetical as 
the one offered by Judge Bright to demonstrate the lack of uniformity in the majority’s 
method. 
 373. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1107 (Bright, J., dissenting). 
 374. Id. at 1108 (discussing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)); see also 
supra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. 
 375. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1108 (Bright, J., dissenting). 
 376. See id.; see also supra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. 
 377. 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 378. Id. at 1064. 
 379. Id. at 1065. 
 380. Id. at 1064.  Specifically, the government alleged that Nacchio was aware of the fact 
that Qwest was making projections based heavily on IRU sales (indefeasible rights of use), 
which are nonrecurring sources of revenue. Id. at 1064 & n.1. 
 381. Id. at 1065. 
 382. Id. at 1066. 
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Nacchio was subsequently charged and convicted of nineteen counts of 
insider trading covering the trades made during April and May 2001.383 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado sentenced Nacchio to 
72 months.384  Nacchio’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to the loss chart 
in 2F1.1 of the Guidelines.385  At trial, there was no dispute that the gross 
proceeds from the relevant stock sales were approximately $52 million;386 
subtracting costs and other fees and taxes, Nacchio’s net profit from the 
trading totaled approximately $28 million, resulting in a Guidelines range 
of 63–78 months.387  The court specifically rejected Nacchio’s argument to 
apply the “market absorption” approach to calculate the illegal “gain,” 
caused directly by his deception.388 
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentence of Nacchio, comparing the 
district court’s gain calculation and Nacchio’s requested market absorption 
method.389  The court first analyzed the discussion in Mooney, noting it as 
the only circuit decision to have addressed the precise issue before the 
court.390  The court summarized the “net profit” approach applied in 
Mooney as well as the Eighth Circuit’s reluctance to apply the civil law 
approach for calculating “gain” in a criminal context.391  The court also 
discussed Judge Bright’s dissenting opinion, which it found convincing.392 
2.  Majority Opinion 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court’s and the Mooney court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines, and determined the approach district courts 
should follow:  1) the district court should take into account that the offense 
is not the sale and purchase of the shares itself but rather the “deception 
intertwined with the sales” due to the possession of nonpublic, material 
 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. at 1069. 
 385. Id. at 1067–69 (describing the district court’s calculation of gain).  Nacchio was 
sentenced under the 2000 Guidelines.  The 2000 Guidelines sentenced insider trading under 
2F1.2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.2 (2000).  This section has 
subsequently been deleted and replaced by 2B1.4. Compare USSG § 2F1.2 (2000), with 
USSG § 2B1.4 (2009).  Additionally, the loss table used to sentence insider trading in the 
2000 Guidelines was in 2F1.1. See USSG § 2F1.1 (2000).  For the purposes of this 
discussion, there is no material difference between how the 2000 Guidelines and the current 
Guidelines’ insider trading provisions function. Compare USSG § 2F1.1 (2000), with USSG 
§ 2B1.1 (2009). 
 386. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1067–68. 
 387. Id. at 1068–69.  The government claimed that taxes should not be included in the 
calculation and insisted that Nacchio’s “gain” for the purposes of sentencing was $44.6 
million. Id.  Nacchio submitted an event study (an economic study that focuses on the 
reaction of the market to the disclosed information, see infra note 480) that claimed that the 
maximum portion of Nacchio’s sales proceeds that would be attributable to inside 
information was only 3.52% of the $52 million, or $1.8 million total. Id. at 1068.  The court 
rejected both of these calculations. Id. 
 388. Id. at 1069. 
 389. See id. at 1067–69. 
 390. Id. at 1069. 
 391. Id. at 1069–70. 
 392. Id. at 1070–71. 
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information and 2) with that in mind, the district court should compute the 
“gain” for sentencing purposes based on the gain “resulting from that 
deception.”393  The court went on to explain that district courts, in 
attempting to base the “gain” calculation only on the deception involved, 
should use the civil disgorgement remedy as guidance in sentencing 
criminal insider trading defendants.394 
Like the Eighth Circuit in Mooney, the Nacchio court first examined the 
plain language of the Guidelines and corresponding commentary for 
support of its approach.395  The court relied heavily on Judge Bright’s 
dissent in Mooney to analyze the meaning of the phrase “the gain resulting 
from the offense.”396  The court concluded that, based on the language from 
the commentary of the Guidelines, both “knowledge and deception” are 
necessary to have committed insider trading.397  The court felt that the 
logical conclusion was necessarily that “any gain associated with lawful 
trading should not be considered gain as used to increase a prison 
sentence.”398 
Further, the court looked to section 1B of the Guidelines for general 
application guidance.399  This section specifies that to be convicted under 
the relevant statute the “offense” includes all “relevant conduct.”400  
“Relevant conduct” is defined as “all acts and omissions committed . . . that 
occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction.”401  All of 
this commentary led the court to believe that Nacchio could not be 
sentenced based on the total profit gained through exercising his options but 
instead only on the “gain” attributed to the nondisclosure of the negative 
information.402 
The court also relied heavily on Dura and MacDonald to address the 
“tangle of factors affecting price” that also influences the calculation of a 
defendant’s sentence.403  Similarly, in the criminal context, the court cited 
United States v. Olis,404 a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
decision recognizing that stock price movements based on other factors 
should not be included in loss determination for accounting fraud.405  The 
Olis court highlighted “thorough analyses grounded in economic reality” as 
the method required to determine loss.406  The Olis court reasoned that the 
intrinsic value decline of stock should be determined to calculate the 
 
 393. Id. at 1072. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. at 1072–73. 
 396. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.2 (2000)). 
 397. Id. at 1072. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at 1073; see also USSG § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(l). 
 400. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1073; see also USSG § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(l). 
 401. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1073 (quoting USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 1074 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005)); see 
also supra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. 
 404. 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 405. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1075 (citing Olis, 429 F.3d at 549). 
 406. Olis, 429 F.3d at 547. 
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sentence, and the district court’s approach had not taken into account “the 
impact of extrinsic factors” on the resulting price of the stock.407 
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a “net profit” approach would 
result in a simple and easily applicable standard to apply in every case.408  
However, the court also noted “a critical objective of federal sentencing is 
the imposition of punishment on the defendant that reflects his or her 
culpability for the criminal offense (rather than for the unrelated gyrations 
of the market).”409  In fact, since the defendant’s freedom is at stake in 
addition to the amount of forfeiture he must surrender, the court agreed with 
the Second Circuit in United States v. Rutkoske410 that the considerations of 
the civil sphere are “at least as strong[]” in the criminal context.411  
Therefore, the court felt that it was appropriate, if not even more important, 
in criminal cases to calculate gain by first examining the “movement of a 
stock’s price after the relevant information is made public.”412 
The court next qualified its approach by noting that although it is 
inappropriate to rely on strategies used in the civil sphere to determine the 
damages of victims, the disgorgement method is designed not only to 
compensate victims, but also to deprive the defendant of unjust enrichment 
from his crime.413  In this sense, the court found that the civil disgorgement 
method is appropriate to use as guidance in the context of sentencing.414  
The court instructed the district court on remand to focus on the same 
factors and analysis applied in civil disgorgement cases, such as 
MacDonald, which would apply the market absorption method argued by 
Nacchio.415 
The court concluded with a discussion about the policy considerations 
that must be taken into account when sentencing.416  The court held that the 
market absorption approach is consistent with the central goals of 
sentencing in that “it endeavors to hold the defendant accountable for the 
portion of the increased value of the stock that is related to his or her 
criminally culpable conduct.  Consequently, it militates against the creation 
of unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated 
defendants.”417  From a policy perspective, the court opined, a sentencing 
approach that focuses on a defendant’s culpability and attempts to avoid 
 
 407. Id. at 548–49. 
 408. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077. 
 409. Id. at 1077 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (“sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary”)). 
 410. 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 411. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078 (citing Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179). 
 412. Id. at 1079 (citing SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 413. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1079–80. 
 414. Id. at 1080. 
 415. Id. at 1078–80 & 1080 n.15. 
 416. Id. at 1080–86. 
 417. Id. at 1080; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
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interference from the unrelated market forces “narrow[s] the zone of 
unpredictability in sentencing.”418 
3.  Resentencing 
Nacchio was resentenced on June 24, 2010 in the District of Colorado.419  
The court reduced Nacchio’s 72-month sentence by only two months.420  
The court acknowledged the directive of the Tenth Circuit to “consider a 
different measure of loss, a measure of loss that correlates to the measure of 
disgorgement that is used in civil securities fraud cases.”421  For purposes 
of calculating this figure, the court characterized “loss” and “gain” as 
“exactly [the] same thing.”422  Both parties presented expert witness 
testimony in the form of two event studies423 to recommend to the court a 
“loss” or “gain” figure.  The government’s expert proffered a study that 
attributed 45%–65% of the total drop in value of Qwest’s stock to the 
revelation of Nacchio’s information that he possessed when trading, which 
resulted in a “gain” figure of $23 to $32 million.424  Nacchio’s expert, 
Professor Daniel R. Fischel, repeated his testimony from Nacchio’s 
previous sentencing hearing, concluding that Nacchio’s use of inside 
information either caused no loss in value of Qwest stock, or only 3.52% of 
the total drop, resulting in a “gain” or “loss” figure of $1.8 million.425 
Importantly, the court noted that both experts agreed “that their studies 
did not and could not perfectly reflect market responsiveness to the 
information.  They referred to their inability to precisely measure as a 
reflection of inherent inefficiencies in the market.”426  The court also 
acknowledged the difficultly in the “methodology to be absolutely precise 
where there is no single, discrete fact that is known to the insider and is 
later revealed on a discrete day,” not unlike Nacchio’s situation, which the 
court and government expert described as “being revealed in dribs and 
drabs over a period of time.”427 
 
 418. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1082.  The court acknowledged also, however, that even the 
disgorgement approach adopted cannot insulate itself completely from “chance market 
forces.” Id. at 1082 n.18. 
 419. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545-MSK 
(D. Colo. June 24, 2010); see also Douglas A. Berman, Much Ado About Two Months in the 
Resentencing of Former Qwest Chief Joe Nacchio, SENT’G.  L. & POL’Y. (June 24, 2010, 
5:25 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/06/much-ado-
about-two-months-in-the-resentencing-of-former-qwest-chief-joe-nacchio.html; Judge Cuts 
Nacchio’s Sentence by 2 Months, Forfeitures by $7 Million, DENVERPOST.COM (June 24, 
2010, 11:31 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_15368168?source=pkg. 
 420. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 419, at 44. 
 421. Id. at 12. 
 422. Id. at 13 (“What we’re looking at is the difference in value between what Mr. 
Nacchio recovered from the sale of his stock . . . and what an investor ultimately in 
possession of the same information would have been able to recover for the same stock.”). 
 423. See supra note 387. 
 424. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 419, at 15. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. at 17. 
 427. Id. 
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Ultimately, the court picked one expert’s testimony—the 
government’s—over the other, determining the “gain” amount to be 
between $23 and $32 million,428 as compared to the original figure of $28 
million.429  The resulting Guidelines range was, therefore, no different than 
the original sentencing range.430  For resentencing, the court decided to use 
the “midpoint” in the Guidelines range, which would be 70 and a half 
months, rounding down to 70 months.431  Therefore, for Nacchio, the 
victory of obtaining a favorable method for resentencing was short lived, as 
the government’s expert testimony triumphed again. 
III.  THE COMMISSION SHOULD REEXAMINE THE IMPACT OF “GAIN” AND 
RESTRUCTURE SECTION 2B1.4 AND SECTION 2B1.1 
The decisions of Mooney and Nacchio demonstrate that the Guidelines’ 
emphasis on “gain” results in sentencing proceedings that are not in line 
with our current legal system’s goals regarding sentencing.432  Not only do 
these decisions exhibit the large discrepancies in sentences imposed on 
similar defendants,433 but they also illustrate the vagueness of the 
Guidelines’ instructions on how courts should calculate this figure.434  
These differences cannot stand if the Guidelines are going to satisfy the 
goals upon which they were conceived.435 
Part III.A of this Note argues that “loss” or “gain” should not be the 
determinative factor in calculating a sentence because it is based on an 
imprecise and contestable figure that is affected by many factors and not 
always directly related to culpability.  Part III.B argues that other factors 
should play an equally important role in sentencing, and the “loss” chart in 
2B1.1 should be restructured.  Part III.B also proposes that the Commission 
use the market absorption method adopted by the Nacchio court to instruct 
users of the Guidelines on how to calculate “gain.”  Part III.C argues that 
the proposed amendments are in line with the role the Commission is 
expected to play in the development of sentencing law. 
A.  The Current Guidelines Put Undue Emphasis on “Gain” 
As the current Guidelines are written, the most dispositive element in 
sentencing—“gain”—is a figure that is neither precise nor related to 
culpability.436  Market imperfections cause the validity of any calculation 
based on a stock price to be called into question.437 
 
 428. Id. at 26; see also id. at 20 (“I credit [the government expert’s] opinion more greatly 
than I credit Professor Fischel.”). 
 429. See supra note 387. 
 430. See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 431. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 419, at 44. 
 432. See supra notes 187, 259–60 and accompanying text; Part II. 
 433. See, e.g., supra notes 340, 344 (comparing Mooney’s potential sentences based on 
the net profit versus the market absportion method under the current Guidelines). 
 434. See supra Part II. 
 435. See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 232–43 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra notes 138–49, 403–07 and accompanying text. 
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As articulated in many cases, the market factors that affect price are not 
easily identified.438  If the defendant’s “gain” from the sale or purchase of 
the security on the basis of inside information is the sole determinative 
factor in sentencing, then the imprecise operation of the stock market has 
been unfairly allowed to determine a defendant’s sentence.439  Furthermore, 
the theories on which courts rely to determine the harm of insider trading 
are not precise enough to be the basis of a sentence.440  The ECMH is a 
core tenant on which the harm of insider trading is based.441  However, the 
ECMH, especially recently, has been under attack.442  If factors not directly 
related to the security in question affect price in addition to the public 
information available as behavioral finance postures,443 then the effect of 
inside trading in the market and on individual market traders could be less 
than originally thought.444 
Additionally, since even economists cannot precisely predict market 
fluctuations, courts certainly should not be required to digest complex 
economic studies in order to reach such a precise and important figure.445  
Since courts are not equipped to continually evaluate economic theory, the 
ability of courts to come to a precise figure representing “loss” or “gain” is 
extremely difficult.446  In the criminal context, when different calculations 
can result in a sentencing disparity of many years, the current Guidelines 
require a figure that is as precise as possible.447  This precision is a standard 
that current methodologies cannot realistically reach. 
Further, the defendant cannot predict the precise rise and fall of stock 
prices; therefore, a precise incremental “loss” or “gain” chart is not 
necessary to indicate the defendant’s state of mind when committing the 
crime.448  A better proxy for determining the defendant’s intent and the 
seriousness of the offense would be a chart that contains fewer increments 
and separate amounts that truly represent large-scale fraud from small-scale 
 
 438. See, e.g., supra notes 100–08 (discussing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 
(2005)); supra notes 403–07 (discussing United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 
2009) and United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
 439. See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text. 
 440. See supra notes 138–48 and accompanying text. 
 441. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra notes 138–49 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra notes 142, 145–48 and accompanying text. 
 444. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 242, at A15 (“Let’s think back to lachrymose news 
stories discussing the sufferings of Enron shareholders, which confidently insisted that fraud 
had cost them $50 billion in stock losses.  That number is still cited by prosecutors, 
politicians and pressies, though it’s based on a brief, outlandish spike in the company’s stock 
price during the Internet bubble.”). 
 445. See, e.g., J. Newman Testimony, supra note 233, at 6 (“The excessive segmentation 
of these monetary loss tables . . . requires sentencing judges to do detailed fact-finding, far 
beyond what is needed to select an appropriate sentence.”). 
 446. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (“But with no staff economists, no experts schooled in the [ECMH], no 
ability to test the validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace 
novel constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory.”). 
 447. See supra notes 231, 409–12 and accompanying text. 
 448. See Bowman, supra note 277, at 38–41 (discussing how loss does indicate 
culpability); supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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fraud.449  Similar to Judge Newman’s burglar who decides to rob a 
convenience store and takes whatever is there, an inside trader will trade on 
the information he possesses, taking a guess at how the stock market will 
reward him.450  Whether he gains $20,000 or $100,000 is not truly within 
his control.451  Therefore, the current chart that contains sixteen increments 
of monetary amounts and corresponding total offense level additions is not 
an appropriate indicator of the defendant’s true culpability.452 
B.  The Guidelines Should Be Amended to Reflect the Importance of “Gain” 
and Other Factors 
1.  Other Factors Should Carry Proportionate Weight 
The economic crimes provisions of the original Guidelines were unique 
in that these sections failed to replicate previous sentencing patterns of 
actual judges.453  However, if the Commission had undertaken this exercise 
to create white collar provisions, it most likely would have discovered 
several other factors that federal judges considered when sentencing white 
collar defendants.454 
According to one study, prior to the Guidelines judges imposed an 
appropriate sentence based on three important concepts:  the sentence 
should reflect the harm done,455 offenders should be sentenced differently 
according to the blameworthiness of their actions,456 and the consequences 
of every sentence to society should be considered.457 
Keeping these norms in mind when sentencing white collar defendants, 
judges considered not only financial loss but also the “spread” of the events 
over time and place, the nature of the victim, and the presence and nature of 
any violation of trust.458  As one of many, this study may guide the 
Commission in utilizing other factors for determining an appropriate 
sentencing range for an insider trading defendant.  For example, duration of 
the offense is one factor that should be included by the Commission in 
 
 449. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 150, at 66–67; J. Newman Testimony, supra note 
233, at 4–5 (“I fully recognize, as do all sentencing regimes, that seriousness of the offense 
should be considered a basis for increasing a sentence . . . stealing one million dollars is 
properly punished more severely than stealing one hundred dollars.  The issue is not whether 
seriousness of the offense should increase severity of the sentence.  The issue is whether 
every minute increment of offense conduct must result in a minute increment of 
punishment.”). 
 450. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 451. See id. 
 452. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2009). 
 453. See supra notes 201–07 and accompanying text. 
 454. See generally WHEELER ET AL., supra note 150 (documenting a study done before the 
first Guidelines were enacted, and interviewing federal judges for their sentencing 
philosophies). 
 455. Id. at 20. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. at 22. 
 458. Id. at 66. 
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considering the defendant’s role in the offense.459  Duration of the offense 
is an indirect indicator of the degree of planning and deliberateness that has 
gone into the conduct, therefore providing insight into the defendant’s 
intent and state of mind.460 
Moreover, further examination into the harm caused by the offense can 
lead the Commission to additional factors upon which to base a sentence.461  
Insider trading law has always primarily been concerned with, and in fact 
requires, a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty.462  As a result, the 
breach of this trust should be at the center of any insider trading sentencing 
proceeding.  In order to determine the degree of this breach for sentencing 
purposes, many factors could be analyzed, such as the level of 
sophistication of the crime, the deceit involved, the effort made to uncover 
the information or extract the information from the source, and the effort 
made to conceal the deception.463 
Additionally, the possibility of recidivism by the defendant should be 
considered.464  Although deterring future crimes by others is an important 
concern in sentencing white collar criminals,465 the possibility of future 
criminal acts by the same offender is most often not a threat.466  These 
criminals have been forced to give up the positions of power that gave them 
the opportunity to commit fraud, and the subsequent public disgrace of a 
criminal conviction leaves these individuals with little incentive or 
opportunity to commit fraud again.467  Additionally, the old age of many 
defendants results in functional life sentences.468  Surely the deterrence of 
future crimes by others can be achieved without such extreme sentences 
based only on the “loss” or “gain” amount. 
 
 459. Id. at 69. 
 460. Id. at 70 (“Duration obtains its importance from its use as a proxy for the repetitive 
and patterned nature of the offense on the one hand, the deliberate, calculating nature of the 
offender on the other.”). 
 461. See supra note 455 and accompanying text. 
 462. See supra Part I.A.3.a. 
 463. See Bowman, supra note 277, at 21. 
 464. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006) (requiring the court to consider the need for 
the sentence to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”). 
 465. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 150, at 22 (“[I]n white-collar cases, general 
deterrence is a most relevant consequence.”). 
 466. See Podgor, supra note 208, at 284. 
 467. See, e.g., id.  Podgor goes on to argue:  
Unlike violent criminals, white-collar offenders are removed from the positions of 
authority that enabled them to commit crimes in the first place . . . .  His criminal 
acts were specific to his business career.  And like so many white-collar offenders, 
his removal from power meant that he was no longer dangerous to society.  It is 
unlikely that he will be returning as a CEO of a major company ever again.  
Id. 
 468. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 283, at 762 (outlining several examples of defendants 
receiving what amounts to life sentences as discussed in Ebbers’ sentencing); supra notes 
209, 226 and accompanying text. 
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2.  The Section 2B1.1 “Loss” Chart Should Be Restructured 
In addition to other factors, “gain” should also be examined to determine 
the culpability and sentence of an insider trading defendant.469  The scale of 
the loss or gain caused by the offense is important to determine the mindset 
of the defendant.470  However, this factor should not be so critical as to 
potentially increase a sentence from six months to 360 months.471  The 
level additions imposed due to “gain” should be proportionate to those 
based on the other factors.472  It is unjust that the 2B1.1 chart can increase a 
defendant’s total offense level by thirty levels,473 when other factors—e.g., 
role in the offense, acceptance of responsibility—can only increase or 
decrease the offense level by two or four levels.474 
In addition to considering the weight that each factor plays in sentencing, 
the Commission should also examine the sentences prescribed for other 
crimes, including state offenses such as violent crimes, in order to 
restructure the Guidelines for fairer sentencing of white collar criminals.475  
There is no other area of the Guidelines that prescribes life sentences to 
first-time, non-violent or non-drug related offenders.476  The white collar 
provisions are unique in this respect, and therefore the Commission should 
consider whether these comparative sentences truly reflect societal 
values.477 
3.  Section 2B1.4 Should Include Instructions from the Commission to 
Calculate Gain Using the Tenth Circuit’s Market Absorption Method 
In addition to restructuring the 2B1.1 chart, the calculation of “gain” 
should be clearly defined in the Guidelines.478  Instructions from the 
Commission concerning a “gain” calculation method are necessary.479  
 
 469. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 150, at 20, 66–68; Bowman, supra note 277, at 38–
39 (arguing that “loss” in a white collar criminal case is a good indication of the mental state 
of the defendant). 
 470. See Bowman, supra note 277, at 38–39. 
 471. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(1), 5A (2009). 
 472. But see Bowman, supra note 277, at 40–41 (arguing that the weight placed on “loss” 
in sentencing is appropriate as compared to other factors). 
 473. See USSG §§ 2B1.1(b)(1), 5A. 
 474. See, e.g., USSG § 3B1.1–1.3 (allowing for a maximum of four additional total 
offense levels depending on the role in the offense); USSG § 3C1.1 (allowing for two 
additional total offense levels for obstruction of justice); USSG § 3E (allowing for a two- 
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility). 
 475. Accord Podgor, supra note 208, at 281–84 (comparing white collar offenses and 
sentences to violent crimes). 
 476. See generally USSG § 5A. 
 477. Accord Podgor, supra note 208, at 281–84. 
 478. See USSG § 2B1.4 cmt. background. 
 479. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 183, at 97–98 (“[T]he Commission has gone out 
of its way to make it clear that it alone will determine the scope and application of concepts 
employed in the Sentencing Guidelines . . . .  The Commission deliberately employed minute 
quantitative distinctions in the Guidelines precisely in order to minimize the opportunity for 
sentencing judges to make discretionary choices.”); supra notes 189–95 and accompanying 
text. 
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Specific instructions will allow courts and parties to a criminal prosecution 
to have a consistent and predictable method on which to base their findings.  
Clear instructions will also obviate the need to compile event studies and 
stage complex arguments supporting one method over another.480  Most 
importantly, instructions will help reduce unwarranted sentencing 
disparities by mandating that courts apply the same procedure to determine 
“gain.”481 
If the Commission does define a “gain” calculation method, it should 
chose to adopt the market absorption method embraced by the Nacchio 
court.482  The market absorption method truly identifies the harm of insider 
trading.483  Using the difference in price between the time of the insider’s 
trade and at the time at which the market absorbs the information better 
represents the opportunity for profit missed by the trader who was 
preempted or the loss incurred by the trader who was induced to trade.484  
Using any other figure is illogical.  After the trading on the inside 
information has been finalized, no more harm to the market, or to other 
traders, is caused since the information has been disclosed.485 
Furthermore, the civil sphere already embraces this method for 
determining SEC penalties and private damages.486  The Nacchio court 
pointed out that the Second Circuit has, in previous cases, employed 
reasoning from civil cases to determine loss causation in criminal cases.487  
Mooney’s brief also argued that there exists a “longstanding practice” of 
applying civil law analysis to criminal cases.488  Mooney argued that the 
language being analyzed in civil insider trading cases and criminal insider 
 
 480. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1068 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(summarizing the event study compiled by University of Chicago economist, Professor 
Daniel R. Fischel).  An event study is an economic study that looks to how the price of the 
stock changes after the fraud was disclosed. See id. at 1068 n.7 (citing United States v. 
Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 867 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Kevin P. McCormick, Untangling the 
Capricious Effects of Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1145, 
1163–79 (2008)). 
 481. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006) (mandating the duty to avoid disparities in 
sentences among similarly situated defendants). 
 482. See supra notes 393, 415 and accompanying text. 
 483. See supra Part I.A.3.b (discussing the point at which insider trading is no longer 
illegal); Part I.A.4 (discussing loss causation and the calculation of damages); notes 164–77 
and accompanying text. 
 484. See supra notes 164–77 and accompanying text. 
 485. See supra note Part I.A.3.b; Part I.A.4; notes 164–77 and accompanying text. 
 486. See supra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
 487. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1078 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing United States 
v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 
110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 488. Reply Brief and Supplemental Addendum of Appellant, supra note 341, at 3 (“There 
is a longstanding practice of applying civil law when analyzing criminal matters concerning 
§ 10b and Rule 10b-5, the provisions at issue here.”) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222 (1980) (applying civil interpretations of Rule 10b-5 in a criminal case); United 
States v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 348 
(9th Cir. 1976) (holding Rule 10b-5 allows civil law precedents interpreting the rule to be 
applicable in criminal prosecutions)). 
2010] THE MORE YOU GAIN, THE MORE YOU LOSE 213 
trading cases is equivalent and, therefore, that civil authorities are both 
“enlightening and cogent.”489 
Finally, although not a perfect system, the market absorption method 
should be used in favor of a method that results in harsher sentences.490  
Simplicity of method should not be preferred to a more complicated method 
that will accurately impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary” as required by the SRA.491 
C.  Amending the Guidelines Is in Line with the Expected Role of the 
Commission and the Goals of Sentencing 
1.  The Commission Should Be Insulated from Political Pressures 
The purpose of creating the Commission as an independent agency in the 
judicial branch was to insulate the Guidelines’ development from political 
pressures.492  The development of the white collar provisions of the 
Guidelines was arguably not insulated from such pressures.493  The 
Commission originally attempted to perform objective analysis when it 
collaborated with other parties to produce the 2001 Economic Crime 
Package.494  However, the subsequent SOX legislation and amendment of 
the Guidelines in response to congressional pressures was inappropriate.495  
Because of the role that strict congressional directives played in the 
development of the white collar provisions, the Commission should 
reassess these areas of the Guidelines divorced from these directives. 
The Commission has recognized this problem in the past and responded 
correctly to it.  The crack-cocaine issue is another area in which the 
Commission was attacked for responding to congressional directives.  The 
result of the 100-to-1 weight ratio created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 (1986 Act) was that a defendant dealing five grams of crack received 
the same mandatory minimum sentence as a defendant dealing 500 grams 
of powder cocaine.496  The Guidelines used weight tables for drugs that 
were very similar to the chart used in white collar provisions.497  The 
 
 489. Id. at 4. 
 490. See supra notes 410–12 and accompanying text; see also Podgor, supra note 208, at 
279 (accusing the current Guidelines of producing “draconian” sentences for white collar 
criminals). 
 491. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); see also supra notes 414–18. 
 492. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 493. See supra Part I.C. 
 494. See supra notes 274–80 and accompanying text. 
 495. See supra notes 281–311 and accompanying text; see also Podgor, supra note 208, 
at 282–83 (“[T]he sentiment is clearly to have tough federal sentencing Guidelines that 
satisfy the public’s wish that the government get ‘tough on crime.’  The very thought that 
those who are privileged might receive a relatively lenient sentence horrifies a public with no 
tolerance for lawbreakers.  Legislators answerable to this public look for ways to ratchet up 
sentences to display their support of victims’ rights and to ensure that those who benefit 
from opportunity are held to a higher standard.”). 
 496. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii), (B)(ii)–(iii) (2006). 
 497. See J. Newman Testimony, supra note 233, at 5–6; supra note 231 and 
accompanying text. 
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weight tables for crack and cocaine were highly disproportionate, and the 
Commission offered no empirical evidence supporting this disparity.498  It 
was clear that the Commission was basing the Guidelines on the standards 
set in the 1986 Act.499 
The Commission later determined that the crack-powder sentencing 
disparity is generally unwarranted.500  Based on additional research, the 
Commission concluded that the disparity “fail[ed] to meet the sentencing 
objectives set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
1986 Act.”501  The Commission attempted in several ways to remedy the 
problem.  In 1995, the Commission proposed amendments to the Guidelines 
that would have replaced the 100-to-1 ratio with a 1-to-1 ratio.502  Congress 
rejected the amendments.503  In response, the Commission issued reports in 
1997 and 2002 recommending that Congress change the weight ratio to 5-
to-1 and then “at least” 20-to-1, respectively.504  Neither proposal prompted 
congressional action.505  Finally in 2007, the Commission again urged 
Congress to amend the 1986 Act and also adopted an ameliorating change 
in the Guidelines.506  The amendment reduced the base offense level 
associated with each quantity of crack by two levels.507  This change 
resulted in crack offenses yielding sentences that are between two and five 
times longer than sentences for equal amounts of powder.508 
The lesson learned from the crack-cocaine disparity is that the 
Commission is expected to perform its own individual research and 
analysis, divorced from congressional pressures, in order to define 
reasonable sentences.509  When the Commission based the crack-cocaine 
provisions of the Guidelines around a congressional act, the result was a 
widespread consensus that the Guidelines were unreasonable.510  In 
response, the Commission appropriately reevaluated these portions to better 
reflect the goals of sentencing as required by the SRA and made legitimate 
 
 498. See Ellis Cose, Closing the Gap, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 2009, at 25 (“Why are the 
penalties for crack and powder so disparate?  Largely because legislators were told—and 
believed—that small-time crack dealers were somehow on a par with big-time powder 
dealers . . . .  There was also the notion that crack was a freakish demon drug—that it was 
many times more addictive, a trigger for violence, and infinitely more dangerous than 
powder in virtually every way.  Those ideas turned out to be either false or overstated.”). 
 499. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007). 
 500. See Cose, supra note 498 (“Since 1995 the Sentencing Commission has been trying 
to set things straight—partly because the law makes no sense . . . .”). 
 501. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 97 (quoting a report issued by the Commission in 2002). 
 502. Id. 
 503. Id. at 99. 
 504. See id. 
 505. See id. 
 506. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (May 2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf. 
 507. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 100. 
 508. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c), 5A (2009). 
 509. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text. 
 510. See supra notes 496–501 and accompanying text. 
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changes in sentencing policy.511  The Commission can and should perform 
this same exercise with the 2B1.1 chart and the insider trading provisions. 
2.  The SRA Requires the Commission to Consider the Purposes of 
Sentencing 
“[S]ufficient, but not greater than necessary”512 should be the phrase that 
guides the Commission’s determination of sentences.513  The Commission 
should be concerned not only with producing precise Guidelines for 
sentencing similarly situated defendants but also with erring on the side of 
leniency in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of imposing a sentence 
that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary.514 
Furthermore, sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants 
were one of the most important motivations behind creating the Guidelines 
and a Commission.515  Therefore, any area of the Guidelines that results in 
widely varied sentences should be reexamined.  The 2B1.1 chart is one such 
area that needs to be reexamined for this purpose.516  Restructuring the 
chart and creating precise instructions on how to calculate “loss” or “gain” 
will bring the Guidelines closer to satisfying the original goals on which 
they were conceived.517  
CONCLUSION 
The circuit split created by the conflicting interpretations of sections 
2B1.1 and 2B1.4 of the Guidelines showcases one of the major difficulties 
courts face when sentencing the perpetrators of complex white collar fraud.  
As examined by this Note, and demonstrated by the district court on remand 
in Nacchio, a defendant’s sentence will be largely determined by the winner 
of a battle of expert witnesses posturing a figure based on theories that are 
inexact at best.  The Commission is in the unique position to resolve this 
major issue in white collar sentencing policy.  By reexamining the white 
collar provisions of the Guidelines and considering the original purposes of 
creating a uniform system of federal sentencing, the Commission is capable 
of bringing courts one step closer to uniform and predictable sentencing of 
white collar offenders. 
 
 511. See supra notes 500–08 and accompanying text. 
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